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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EXPERIENCE
Madhavi Sunder*
In today’s economy, consumers demand experiences. From Star Wars to Har-
ry Potter, fans do not just want to watch or read about their favorite charac-
ters—they want to be them. They don the robes of Gryffindor, flick their 
wands, and drink the butterbeer. The owners of fantasy properties under-
stand this, expanding their offerings from light sabers to the Galaxy’s Edge®, 
the new Disney Star Wars immersive theme park opening in 2019.
Since Star Wars, Congress and the courts have abetted what is now a $262 
billion-a-year industry in merchandising, fashioning “merchandising rights” 
appurtenant to copyrights and trademarks that give fantasy owners exclusive 
rights to supply our fantasy worlds with everything from goods to a good 
time. But are there any limits? Do merchandising rights extend to fan activi-
ty, from fantasy-themed birthday parties and summer camps to real world 
Quidditch leagues? This Article challenges the conventional account, arguing 
that as the economic value of fantasy merchandising increases in the emer-
gent “experience economy,” intellectual property owners may prove less keen 
on tolerating uncompensated uses of their creations. In fact, from Amazon’s 
Kindle Worlds granting licenses for fan fiction, to crackdowns on sales of fan 
art sold on internet sites like Etsy, to algorithms taking down fan videos from 
YouTube, the holders of intellectual property in popular fantasies are seeking 
to create a world requiring licenses to make, do, and play. This Article turns 
to social and cultural theories of art as experience, learning by doing, tacit 
knowledge, and performance to demonstrate that fan activity, from discus-
sion sites to live-action role-playing fosters learning, creativity, and sociabil-
ity. Law must be attentive to the profound effects these laws have on human 
imagination and knowledge creation. I apply the insights of these theories to 
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limit merchandising rights in imaginative play through fair use, the force in 
the legal galaxy intended to bring balance to intellectual property law.
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Introduction
“Tell me one last thing,” said Harry. “Is this real? Or has this been happening 
inside my head?” 
. . . .
“Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should 
that mean that it is not real?”
– Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows1
1. J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows 723 (2007).
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Yale psychologist Paul Bloom observes that American adults spend on 
average four minutes a day on sex and over four hours a day in imaginary 
worlds.2 Today, entertainment and play extend well beyond reading and 
watching, to writing, doing, making, and performing. One does not just read 
Harry Potter—fans inhabit the virtual world of Harry Potter: Hogwarts Mys-
tery,3 make handmade Hogwart’s uniforms to sell on Etsy, and play Quid-
ditch for their university. There are more than 300 real-world Quidditch 
teams at high schools and universities worldwide.4 From the Wizarding 
World of Harry Potter to interactive gaming5 to Comic-Con6 to creating and 
viewing YouTube fan theories,7 our lives are spent living in the imaginary 
worlds we love.8 Indeed, we celebrate life’s most important moments with 
fantasy-themed parties, including birthdays and even weddings.9
As consumer researchers have become savvier about how to package 
and market the human need for fantasy, play, and imagination, areas of 
thought and expression once free as the air we breathe are increasingly be-
coming commodified and metered fare, regulated by licenses and royalties, 
2. Paul Bloom, How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why We Like What
We Like 155 (2010).
3. The latest Harry Potter interactive experience, Harry Potter: Hogwarts Mystery, is a 
narrative role-playing game in which players create their own characters who attend Hogwarts 
as students. The game allows players to make their own narrative choices and experience new 
and unique adventures in their favorite wizarding world. See Harry Potter: Hogwarts Mys-
tery, http://www.harrypotterhogwartsmystery.com [https://perma.cc/K28X-NA6L].
4. Marissa Fessenden, Muggles, Rejoice: Quidditch Is Becoming a Serious Sport, Smith-
sonian.com (July 30, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/quidditch-game-
harry-potter-becoming-serious-sport-180956108/ [https://perma.cc/WRA8-YXM7].
5. This includes massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs), massively multiplayer 
online role-playing games (MMORPGs), and virtual reality games (VRs).
6. Comic-Con is an annual international convention held in San Diego where people 
make and inhabit elaborate costumes of their favorite fictional characters. See generally About 
Comic-Con International, Comic-Con Int’l: San Diego, https://www.comic-con.org/about
[https://perma.cc/UF2S-B234].
7. See, e.g., Brizzy Voices, 26 UNSOLVED Harry Potter Questions! ft Tessa Netting,
YouTube (July 8, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=428&v=
boNc6P1UPPw.
8. As the historian Michael Saler describes, today many people, both adults and chil-
dren, are “living in imaginary worlds.” Michael Saler, As If: Modern Enchantment and
the Literary Prehistory of Virtual Reality 18 (2012).
9. See Emily Glazer & Erich Schwartzel, Darth Vader, Your Presence Is Required at Our 
Star Wars Wedding, Wall Street J., (Aug. 1, 2018, 12:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
wedding-cake-check-bouquet-check-darth-vader-to-officiate-thats-harder-1533141925 (on file 
with the Michigan Law Review) (“Since Walt Disney Co. bought Lucasfilm Ltd. for $4 billion in 
2012, demand for Vaders, stormtroopers and other Star Wars characters at weddings has 
grown so much, there’s now a shortage.”). Currently, nonprofit groups send volunteers to 
dress as Star Wars characters at weddings in exchange for the bride and groom making a dona-
tion to charity. See id. Will Disney seek to cash in on this craze, and claim an exclusive right to 
do so? In the meantime, Etsy vendors sell hand-made novelties, such as Star Wars themed 
wedding invitations. See Star Wars Wedding Invitations, Etsy, https://www.etsy.com/market/
star_wars_wedding_invitations [https://perma.cc/Y7WA-89R5].
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requiring permission and payment. We are witnessing a shift in the nature of 
both consumption and entertainment. In today’s economy, “[g]oods and 
services are no longer enough.”10 Today’s consumers demand experiences.11
From Star Wars to Harry Potter, fans do not just want to watch or read their 
favorite characters. They want to be them.12 They want to don the robes of 
Gryffindor, flick their wands, and drink the butterbeer. As The Economist
observes, consumers are made happier through “ ‘experiences’ over com-
modities, pastimes over knick-knacks, doing over having.”13
These experiences are increasingly the stuff of intellectual property 
claims through the emergence of an expansive merchandising right that rests 
on both copyright and trademark. Until now, intellectual property holders 
have largely tolerated individuals who seek to bring their fictional worlds to 
life, on the theory that going after one’s fans is not good for business.14 But 
the emergence of an experience economy will lead many owners of cultural 
property to reconsider their laissez-faire attitude toward play. Indeed, we are 
already seeing the beginning of the commodification of some long-tolerated 
fan activity. Increasingly, owners of cultural properties are issuing cease-
and-desist demands to third parties and offering their own official pay-to-
play options. Amazon.com launched Kindle Worlds, a forum to write and 
sell fan fiction based on specific licensed media properties.15 Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox stopped the sale of handmade knit hats on Etsy inspired by the 
short-lived Joss Whedon TV series, Firefly, after Fox decided it would exclu-
sively license the hats.16 YouTube algorithms to protect copyright are wreak-
ing havoc on Game of Thrones fan theory sites, where fans use video clips 
from the popular HBO series to discuss everything from character develop-
10. B. Joseph Pine II & James H. Gilmore, The Experience Economy ix (updated ed. 
2011).
11. The rise of modern brands follows this logic—Starbucks is not about the coffee. In-
deed, its new logo dropped the word coffee altogether. Julie Jargon, Starbucks Drops Coffee 
from Logo, Wall Street J. (Jan. 6, 2011, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748704405704576063940765196656 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
12. Columbia Sportswear offers Star Wars coats resembling those worn by Luke, Han 
Solo, and Leia. See Echo Base Collection Star Wars Jackets, Columbia, https://
www.columbia.com/starwars/ [https://perma.cc/83NC-S6WC].
13. Economics Discovers Its Feelings, Economist (Dec. 19, 2006), https://www.
economist.com/node/8401269 [https://perma.cc/7R5Z-BYFT].
14. See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 617–20 (2008).
15. See Kindle Worlds, https://kindleworlds.amazon.com/worldsAmazon [https://
perma.cc/VN2U-KSDH].
16. Leah Yamshon, ‘I Almost Got Sued for Knitting a Firefly Hat’: The Legal Risks of Pop-
Culture Fan Art, PCWorld (July 19, 2013, 3:30 AM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/
2044685/i-almost-got-sued-for-knitting-a-firefly-hat-the-legal-risks-of-pop-culture-fan-
art.html [https://perma.cc/88Y7-7MXW].
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ment to symbolism in the World of Ice and Fire.17 The Tolkein estate shut 
down an unlicensed Lord of the Rings summer camp.18 Disney ordered bak-
ers to cease and desist making “counterfeit edible cake[s]” featuring protect-
ed characters like Luke Skywalker.19 Paramount Pictures and CBS claim a 
copyright in Klingon.20 DC Comics enjoined a custom carmaker from mak-
ing and selling real-life replicas of the Batmobile.21 Disney filed a trademark 
suit against a game maker for creating a mobile version of the fictional card 
game from the Star Wars universe, “Sabaac,” the game in which Han Solo 
famously won the Millennium Falcon from Lando Calrissian.22 Netflix sent a 
cease-and-desist letter to the owners of a pop-up bar in Chicago based on its 
popular new television series, Stranger Things, with the quip, “We love our 
fans more than anything, but you should know the Demogorgon is not al-
ways as forgiving.”23 The Cartoon Network prevented fans from opening an 
unauthorized Rick and Morty themed pop-up bar in Washington, DC, 
claiming the move “wasn’t polite and aimed at profiting off of Rick and 
Morty fans.”24 Fans responded that the bar would have been a labor of love 
and that the company was denying fans the freedom to “geek out.”25
17. Chris Mills, HBO Is Abusing Copyright to Take ‘Game of Thrones’ Fan Videos off 
YouTube, BGR (May 10, 2016, 9:30 PM), http://bgr.com/2016/05/10/game-of-thrones-
youtube-theories-hbo/ [https://perma.cc/QP2E-G52F].
18. Mike Masnick, Tolkien Estate Strikes Again: Forces Summer Camp to Change Name,
Techdirt (Apr. 20, 2011, 11:40 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110419/
01104713954/tolkien-estate-strikes-again-forces-summer-camp-to-change-names.html
[https://perma.cc/P3FM-2HXC].
19. Eriq Gardner, Disney Sues over Edible Cake Frosting Featuring Marvel, Lucasfilm 
Characters, Hollywood Rep. (Sept. 3, 2015, 6:47 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/
thr-esq/disney-sues-edible-cake-frosting-820032 [https://perma.cc/P633-8ZFA].
20. See David Post, Copyright in Klingon, Wash. Post: Volokh Conspiracy (Jan. 9, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/09/copyright-
in-klingon/ [https://perma.cc/BK42-NUGQ]; Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Axanar Prods., Inc., 
121 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)1699 (C.D. Cal. 2017).
21. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2015).
22. Gene Maddaus, Disney Files Trademark Suit to Protect ‘Star Wars’ Card Game, Va-
riety (Dec. 21, 2017, 4:50 PM), https://variety.com/2017/biz/news/sabacc-trademark-lawsuit-
star-wars-disney-lucasfilm-ren-ventures-1202647603/ [https://perma.cc/A74R-MHX4].
23. John Lynch, Netflix Asked a ‘Stranger Things’ Pop-up Bar to Shut Down with This 
Humorous Cease-and-Desist Letter, Bus. Insider (Sept. 19, 2017, 10:34 AM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/netflix-stranger-things-pop-up-bar-funny-cease-and-desist-letter-
2017-9 [https://perma.cc/9NP2-QK4T].
24. Sam Slaughter, ‘Rick and Morty’ Pop-Up Bar Shut Down by Cartoon Network, Man-
ual (Aug. 20, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://www.themanual.com/food-and-drink/wubba-lubba-
dub-pub-rick-and-morty-pop-up-bar/ [https://perma.cc/ZFW3-FPZX]. Hotels and bars regu-
larly entertain guests with cleverly-named cocktails named after customers’ favorite shows. 
This author, for example, enjoyed sipping a Game of Thrones inspired drink, “The Red Keep,” 
at the Four Seasons in Silicon Valley. Is the Watergate Hotel in Washington, DC (free-)riding
on Hamilton’s coattails with its “Hamilton Inspired Cocktail Menu”? The cocktails include:
The Hamilton Manhattan: Wild Turkey 101, Averna, Bitters
The Angelica: Spicy Tequila, Lime, Cane, P.O.M
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This Article examines the phenomenon of living in imaginary worlds 
that are protected by copyrights and trademarks. Copyright and trademark 
have expanded from what we read to how we live.26 While living in fantasy 
worlds is as old as child’s play, “what is newn . . . is that experiences represent 
the basis of economic activity.”27 To take a quotidian example, “[p]eople rare-
ly if ever bought birthday parties . . . in previous economic eras; [but] today 
they do so regularly.”28 As leading scholars have noted, we are seeing the 
commodification of what had been the public domain as intellectual proper-
ty marches into ever new corners of our lives.29 The commodification of ex-
periences, however, goes beyond the enclosure of speech into the enclosure 
of cultural practices.
The commodification of experience is built upon an ever-expanding le-
gal “merchandising right” grounded in both copyright and trademark. Put 
simply: Star Wars would not be Star Wars without the Copyright Act of 
1976, which expanded considerably from focusing on exact or substantially 
similar reproductions in the same medium, to ownership of derivatives in a 
wide range of media, even those far flung from the original work.30 The de-
rivative work right and Star Wars were born together. Today, the merchan-
The Eliza: Vodka Lime, Pineapple, Cassis, Granita
The Lafayette: Hardy VS Cognac, Bourbon, Balsamic Lavender, Bitters




26. This Article is part of my broader work on branding and the commodification of 
luxury, experience, and look and feel. See The Luxury Economy and Intellectual Proper-
ty: Critical Reflections (Haochen Sun, Barton Beebe & Madhavi Sunder eds., 2015); Mario 
Biagioli, Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Brand New World: Distinguishing Oneself in 
the Global Flow, 47 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 455 (2013); Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder, Design Pa-
tents: Law Without Design, 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 277 (2013); Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder, 
The Law of Look and Feel, 90 S. Cal. L. Rev. 529 (2017).
27. Pine & Gilmore, supra note 10, at xix.
28. Id.; see also Jeremy Rifkin, The Age of Access: The New Culture of HyperCap-
italism, Where All of Life Is a Paid-For Experience 97 (2000) (“The Age of Access is de-
fined, above all else, by the increasing commodification of all human experience. Commercial 
networks of every shape and kind weave a web around the totality of human life, reducing eve-
ry moment of lived experience to a commodified status.”).
29. James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind (2008); 
Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of 
the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999); David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain,
L. & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1981, at 147; Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory
L.J. 965 (1990).
30. See Robert A. Gorman, Essay, An Overview of the Copyright Act of 1976, 126 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 856, 866 (1978) (“[M]ost works presently known or contemplated by the mind of man 
fall within the list of works to which federal copyright extends under the new Act . . . .”).
November 2018] Intellectual Property in Experience 203
dising right is being stretched to cover not just goods, but also the right to 
give fans a good time. 
The assertion of an exclusive merchandising right over fan culture and 
activity should not be surprising. In today’s economy, the value of merchan-
dise, and merchandising experience, far surpasses the value of the underlying 
intellectual properties themselves. Merchandising is a $262 billion-a-year in-
dustry.31 Exclusive merchandising licenses drive cultural production, under-
writing the costs of making films and directing which creative projects get 
pursued in the first place. The Harry Potter franchise has earned more than 
$25 billion.32 When Disney revived the Star Wars franchise with the release 
of The Force Awakens, the “real moneymaker for . . . Disney” was the associ-
ated merchandise.33 Analysts noted that “Star Wars will make its real money 
in the mall, not the cinema.”34
Given the economic and cultural importance of the merchandising
right,35 there is a surprising paucity of scholarship on this topic. Stacey 
Dogan and Mark Lemley chronicle the uneasy doctrinal foundations of the 
right under trademark law.36 Irene Calboli defends the merchandising right 
under trademark law on the ground that it protects against confusion as to 
sponsorship.37 Scholars have offered important critiques of the so-called 
31. In 2016, global retail sales of licensed goods reached a record $262 billion, boosted 
by the release of new Star Wars films, according to the Licensing Industry Merchandisers As-
sociation. Ryan Faughnder, Year-Round ‘Star Wars’ Toy Sales Boost Entertainment Merchan-
dise Revenue, L.A. Times (May 22, 2017, 10:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/
hollywood/la-fi-ct-licensing-star-wars-20170522-story.html [https://perma.cc/98DA-4PPP]; 
Dave McNary, ‘Star Wars’ Movies Push Overall Licensed Merchandise Sales to $262 Billion, Va-
riety (May 22, 2017, 9:00 AM), http://variety.com/2017/film/news/star-wars-movies-licensed-
merchandise-1202438161/ [https://perma.cc/5PK7-6M6R].
32. Nick Wells & Mark Fahey, Harry Potter and the $25 Billion Franchise, CNBC (June 
22, 2017, 11:29 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/13/harry-potter-and-the-25-billion-
franchise.html [https://perma.cc/8EDS-NJUC].
33. Natalie Robehmed, For Disney, Biggest Payday on Star Wars Won’t Be at the Box 
Office, Forbes (Dec. 16, 2015, 10:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/
2015/12/16/how-disneys-star-wars-merchandise-is-set-to-make-billions/ (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review) (“Though [Star Wars: The Force Awakens] is expected to earn big bucks 
at the box office—as much as $500 million in its opening weekend—the real moneymaker for 
Walt Disney is Star Wars merchandise.”).
34. Maddison Connaughton, Star Wars Will Make Its Real Money in the Mall, Not the 
Cinema, Vox (Dec. 18, 2015, 2:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/12/18/10606300/star-wars-
business-explained [https://perma.cc/3PTL-Q2FY] (“[A] $3999 Millennium Falcon kid’s bed 
and toy lightsabers—these are the real force behind Star Wars.”).
35. While the “merchandising right” usually refers to trademark rights, in this Article I 
use the term to also cover the complex set of copyright doctrines that protect rights in mer-
chandise, from substantial similarity to look and feel protection, the derivative work right, and 
the right to public performance. Conflicts involving merchandise inspired by fantasy works 
usually involve claims of both trademark and copyright.
36. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait 
Accompli?, 54 Emory L.J. 461 (2005).
37. Irene Calboli, The Case for a Limited Protection of Trademark Merchandising, 2011 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 865.
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merchandising right, arguing that the law extends copyright and trademark 
beyond their traditional concerns, is built on circular reasoning, and has 
pernicious effects on competition and innovation.38
This Article considers the doctrine of merchandising rights in light of 
broader cultural practices that are founded on intellectual properties in fan-
tasy worlds. Drawing upon cultural and social science theory, I seek to com-
plement these earlier arguments by arguing that pay-to-play can extend a 
copyright and trademark holder’s rights in ways that intrude excessively on 
other rights, in particular the ability to play, imagine, and learn with others, 
and to reference the cultural works that shape our lives and societies.39
Other important scholarship has sought to keep open a liberal space for 
individuals to engage in fan fiction—the practice of extending the fictional 
world through written stories.40 In this Article, I explore efforts to extend 
stories through the material world. Fan activity and fan activism allow for 
critical modes of social and experiential learning and innovation that we 
must understand to regulate appropriately. Despite the noncommercial na-
ture of much of this activity, intellectual property holders claim the right to 
control many of these activities; fan use continues only at the sufferance of 
trademark and copyright owners. Dale Nelson, Vice President and Intellec-
tual Property Counsel for Warner Bros., says they “tolerate” fan uses of their 
brand properties but are ready to act if a fan is “running a business based on 
our properties,” or in situations where Warner Bros. believes it is protecting 
its derivative markets “or potential markets.” “We may not be in that market 
today,” Nelson says, “but we may be” in the future.41
But are there any limits? 
38. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 36, at 464–65 (“[M]uch of the multi-billion dollar 
industry of merchandise licensing has grown around a handful of cases from the 1970s and 
1980s that established merchandising rights with little regard for the competing legal or policy 
concerns at stake.”); Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 
Wis. L. Rev. 429, 524–25 (arguing that copyright law has been stretched beyond its traditional 
focus on substantial similarity).
39. Others have critically examined the role of excessive copyright on the freedom to 
play and imagine. See Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and
the Play of Everyday Practice (2012); David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copy-
right and the Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, L. & Contemp.
Probs., Spring 1992, at 139, 146 (1992) (expressing concern that copyright threatens “our in-
nate emotional hunger for creative play, and our considerable incapacity to resist indulging 
it”); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 Yale L.J. 1
(2002).
40. See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Performance, Property, and the Slashing of Gender in Fan 
Fiction, 14 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 461 (2006); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Cop-
yright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 651 (1997). For my own 
work on this topic, see also Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A 
Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 597 (2007).
41. Interview with Dale Nelson, Vice President and Intellectual Prop. Counsel, Warner 
Bros. Entm’t Inc., in L.A., Cal. (May 2, 2012) (on file with author).
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In this Article, I seek to identify those limits, grounding them in social 
and cultural theory. Some may dismiss any discussion of wands, wizards, 
and YouTube videos as trivial. But much of the studies in the humanities 
and social sciences are dedicated to the study of experience, performance, 
embodiment, and learning by doing. Drawing on the scholarship of John 
Dewey, Kenneth Arrow, Michael Polanyi, and Peggy Phelan, I show that 
deep play with the art and stories of our time is a critical way to learn and 
engage with the world. This scholarship demonstrates why we must find lim-
its to the merchandising right, preserving freedom of imagination and play.42
The argument proceeds in four parts. Part I chronicles the rise of pay-to-
play, first with tangible merchandise and then expanding into licensed expe-
riences inspired by fictional worlds—going metaphorically and literally from 
purchasing light sabers to visiting the Galaxy’s Edge, the new Disney Star 
Wars immersive theme park opening in 2019.
These expansions of the word into the material world are undergirded 
by law, the “merchandising right.” Part II turns to the tenuous foundations 
of the merchandising right in trademark and copyright law. Economics has 
been the main driver of merchandising law. Since the 1970s and 1980s, 
courts have recognized a right of intellectual property owners to exclusively 
license their characters and literary creations based on the circular and dis-
credited reasoning of “if value, then right.”43 Courts, recognizing exclusive 
licensing rights as lucrative, supported them. The results often steer far from 
their conceptual moorings in trademark and copyright law.
Part III turns to cultural and social science theory to better understand 
the role of haptic engagement in fantasy worlds. Perhaps the most influential 
American theorist of aesthetic experience is John Dewey. Dewey argued that 
aesthetic progress ought to be measured not by the creation of artistic works, 
but by the extent of human engagement and participation with cultural 
works.44 Dewey’s insights are all the more poignant today in the wake of DIY 
(do-it-yourself), the Maker Movement, and User Generated Content (UGC) 
enabled by new technologies and the internet. Kenneth Arrow’s theory of 
“learning by doing”45 and Michael Polanyi’s account of tacit knowledge, 
which reveals how scientific knowledge must be experimented with in labs 
42. Julie Cohen’s important work also explores the importance of play, made possible 
through legal affordances. See Cohen, supra note 39, at 32–104.
43. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language 
in the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 403–12 (1990); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante 
Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 129 (2004) [hereinafter 
Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications].
44. John Dewey, Art as Experience (1934); see, e.g., Barton Beebe, Bleistein, The 
Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making of American Copyright Law, 117 Colum. L. Rev.
319, 343–46 (2017) (“[P]ragmatist aesthetics measures aesthetic progress (or regress) largely by 
the extent of popular, democratic participation in aesthetic practice.”).
45. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, 29 Rev. Econ.
Stud. 155, 155 (1962) [hereinafter Arrow, Learning by Doing].
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with mentors and colleagues,46 are also gaining new purchase in copyright 
scholarship and in the digital context as we increasingly recognize that cul-
tural knowledge, too, must be actively experienced, repeated, held, touched, 
tasted, and practiced with others to be fully known and enjoyed. Finally, I 
turn to performance theory, which describes the development of individual 
agency through physical “embodiment” in the cultural worlds we love.47
As we shall see, fan activity—from discussion sites to live-action role-
playing—fosters learning, creativity, autonomy, sociability, and sheer joy. 
Law must be attentive to the profound effects these laws have on human im-
agination and knowledge creation. As I argued in my book, From Goods to a 
Good Life: Intellectual Property and Global Justice, intellectual property law 
must lift its gaze from the mere promotion of more goods, to the promotion 
of a good life: that is, the ability of citizens to deeply engage, practice, experi-
ence, critique, learn, and create knowledge for themselves.48
In Part IV, I apply the insights of these theories to limit merchandising 
rights in imaginative play through fair use, the force in the legal galaxy in-
tended to bring balance to the law. This Part argues that fair use ought to 
privilege three categories of transformative uses by fans: (a) works that pro-
mote learning by doing; (b) cases involving the creation of a new work; and 
(c) exploitation of derivative markets that plaintiffs are unlikely to exploit.
I. The Rise of Pay-to-Play: From Action Figures to the 
Galaxy’s Edge
Prior to the 1970s, children’s play was largely free of royalty payments, 
the stuff of homemade Cinderella ball gowns and unbranded toys. Today, we 
increasingly face pay-to-play. Child’s play is now serious business. Cultural 
play involves “officially licensed” cultural merchandise. This market only 
promises to grow in light of new media offerings of ever more elaborate 
modes of play, including virtual and augmented reality and detailed real-
world renderings based on fictional accounts.
But the leap of fiction from the page, to television, and then to stuff has 
yet one more turn: to the realm of experience. And with each move, com-
modification follows.
46. Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Univ. of Chi. Press ed. 2009) (1966).
47. Carrie Noland, Agency and Embodiment: Performing Gestures/Producing
Culture 2 (2009).
48. Madhavi Sunder, From Goods to a Good Life: Intellectual Property and
Global Justice 22 (2012) [hereinafter Sunder, From Goods to a Good Life].
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A. The Force Awakens: The Rise of Merchandising
“Merchandising! Merchandising! Where the real money from the movie 
is made! Spaceballs the t-shirt. Spaceballs the coloring book. Spaceballs the 
lunchbox. Spaceballs the breakfast cereal. Spaceballs the flame thrower—the 
kids love this one.” 
– Spaceballs49
Any periodization of the new merchandising and experience economy 
will find at least two time periods, cleaved by Star Wars. Prior to the first 
Star Wars film’s debut in 1977, entertainment products based on shows such 
as Howdy Doody in the 1950s, Star Trek in the 1960s, and The Six Million 
Dollar Man in the 1970s were licensed for use on a variety of products, from 
toys, to lunch boxes, to T-shirts. But total retail sales for all merchandising 
products in 1977 were just under $5 billion annually.50 The release of Star
Wars was “the watershed of modern merchandising,”51 with the first trilogy 
itself accounting for about $4 billion in merchandise sales, “nearly double 
the ticket revenues of the original movie trilogy.”52 As a treatise on the emer-
gent law of merchandising notes, “[a]fter Star Wars, merchandising grew ex-
ponentially.”53
Merchandising: 
[R]efers to the licensing of “properties,” such as words, names, titles, sym-
bols, designs, or fictional characters, for use on or in association with prod-
ucts. Such merchandise licensing aims to increase consumer demand for 
both the original property and the related product, and is an increasingly 
important marketing device. . . . A successful merchandising program may 
even be more profitable than the work from which the property is de-
rived.54
Merchandising is a kin of branding, moving a business from simply produc-
ing goods to marketing them.
Mego Corporation helped start this growth industry by introducing a 
3.75-inch action figure in the United States in 1976, relabeling a toy intro-
duced by Takara originally in Japan.55 With the launch of Star Wars in 1977, 
49. Spaceballs (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. 1987).
50. Richard Raysman et al., Intellectual Property Licensing: Forms and Analy-
sis § 9.01 (2017).
51. Id.
52. James T. Madore, Lego Banking Toy Line on ‘The Force,’ Newsday (Feb. 9, 1999, 
7:00 PM), https://www.newsday.com/business/lego-banking-toy-line-on-the-force-1.413764
[https://perma.cc/U6NP-AA9C].
53. Raysman et al., supra note 50, § 9.01.
54. Id.
55. Roddy BW, This Is the Empty Box You’re Looking For: How the First Kenner ‘Star 
Wars’ Toys Came to Be, Geeks, https://geeks.media/this-is-the-empty-box-you-re-looking-for-
how-the-first-kenner-star-wars-toys-came-to-be [https://perma.cc/7JQ4-G548]. Takara had 
introduced a 3.75-inch “Microman” line of action figures in Japan in 1974, released in the 
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Kenner Products (now part of Hasbro) introduced 3.75-inch Star Wars ac-
tion figures.56
Another critical turning point came when the familiar Danish toy giant 
Lego joined the world of licensing. Prior to 1999, Lego built its own brand 
around generic “bricks” with which children could build anything their 
minds could imagine or what they saw around them. But as the company en-
tered the new millennium and saw its fans leaving for video games and elec-
tronic entertainment, Lego faced its first economic losses in decades and 
“nearly went under.”57 Its salvation? Licensed Legos.58 Lego has since signed 
license deals for official play sets built around such mega properties as Star 
Wars, The Lord of the Rings, Winnie the Pooh, and Harry Potter.59 On the 
strength of its licensing portfolio, Lego became the most valuable toymaker 
in the world.60
Today, cultural merchandising fuels cultural creation itself; licensing 
deals finance film production. Warner Bros. invested more than $125 million 
in the motion picture version of J.K. Rowling’s first book in the Harry Potter
series, Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone.61 The studio underwrote its 
enormous investment with more than $100 million in advances from about 
90 domestic licensees and 200 international licensees related to the film’s 
characters and creations, from Quidditch brooms to wands to candy to cos-
tumes.62 Most of the license agreements included the right to create products 
United States under the “Micronauts” name in 1976. See Takara Henshin Cyborg Series (1972-
1975), Micro Heritage, http://www.microforever.com/henshinindex.htm [https://perma.cc/
V6EC-5PKY].
56. Kenner originally sold a cardboard display stand with a postcard allowing the owner 
to later receive four figurines because the toys were not ready by the holiday season. Roddy 
BW, supra note 55.
57. Sam Thielman, How Lego Became the Most Valuable Toy Company in the World: A 
Bucketload of License Deals, Adweek (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.adweek.com/brand-
marketing/how-lego-became-most-valuable-toy-company-world-148578/ [https://perma.cc/
9V7M-SCGH].
58. The company insists that users not describe the bricks as Legos, a reference to the 
company’s fear about genericide. See LEGO (@LEGO_Group), Replying to @RichardvReeves,
Twitter (Aug. 20, 2014, 6:35 AM), https://twitter.com/LEGO_Group/status/
502086477652959232 [https://perma.cc/E46Q-94EP]
(“@RichardvReeves Please go with ‘LEGO bricks’ or ‘LEGO sets.’ Doing so will help protect 
and preserve our brand. Thanks for checking!”).
59. Thielman, supra note 57.
60. Tom Metcalf & Robert LaFranco, Lego Builds New Billionaires as Toymaker Topples 
Mattel, Bloomberg (Mar. 13, 2013, 6:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2013-03-13/lego-builds-new-billionaires-as-toymaker-topples-mattel (on file with the Michi-
gan Law Review).
61. 1 Gregory J. Battersby & Charles W. Grimes, The Law of Merchandise and
Character Licensing: Merchandising Law and Practice § 2.8, at 78 (2017).
62. Id.
November 2018] Intellectual Property in Experience 209
for the second Harry Potter movie, yet to be released.63 Lucasfilm’s deal with 
toy manufacturer Hasbro reportedly guaranteed the film company $600 mil-
lion in royalties.64 George Lucas received warrants to purchase about 7.4 per-
cent of Hasbro in the transaction.65 Hasbro predicted that the “sale[] of li-
censed toys alone would top $5 billion for the three prequel films.”66 Given 
these vast sums, it is not surprising that Hollywood chooses its projects with 
an eye to their potential for cultural merchandising. 
The Star Wars films: $8.2 billion.
The Star Wars merchandise: $37 billion.67
B. A New Hope: The Rise of the Experience Economy
In the 1970s, George Lucas put light sabers in children’s hands. In 2019, 
Disney will open a new immersive theme park called Star Wars Galaxy’s 
Edge in Orlando, Florida and Anaheim, California. Disney explains its revo-
lutionary plan: 
From the second you arrive, you will become a part of a Star Wars story! 
You’ll immediately become a citizen of the galaxy and experience all that 
entails, including dressing up in the proper attire. Once you leave Earth, 
you will discover a starship alive with characters, stories, and adventures 
that unfold all around you. It is 100% immersive, and the story will touch 
every single minute of your day, and it will culminate in a unique journey 
for every person who visits.68
If 1977 marked the rise of merchandising, 2019 may mark the rise of experi-
ence. The galaxy once far, far away is now here.
Star Wars is hardly alone in having a large and enthusiastic fan base ea-
ger to bring the fictional world to life. Few fictional works have challenged 
the boundaries between real and unreal as Harry Potter. The intangible fan-
tasy world created by J.K. Rowling has found a life in the real world, from the 
creation of a global Dumbledore’s Army of young people dedicated to up-
holding the books’ values in the real world,69 to a real-world, online Daily 
63. Id.
64. Id. at 73.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 72.
67. Lee Seymour, Over the Last 20 Years, Broadway’s ‘Lion King’ Has Made More Money 
for Disney than ‘Star Wars,’ Forbes (Dec. 18, 2017, 5:13 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
leeseymour/2017/12/18/the-lion-king-is-making-more-money-for-disney-than-star-wars/
[https://perma.cc/92CR-PTRS].
68. Jennifer Fickley-Baker, Plans Unveiled for Star Wars-Inspired Themed Resort at Walt 
Disney World, Disney Parks Blog (July 15, 2017), https://disneyparks.disney.go.com/blog/
2017/07/plans-unveiled-for-star-wars-inspired-themed-resort-at-walt-disney-world/ [https://
perma.cc/D9Q4-TT3L]
(quoting Bob Chapek, Chairman of Walt Disney Parks & Resorts).
69. Lisa Granshaw, The Harry Potter Alliance: A Real Dumbledore’s Army Uses Their 
Passion to Make a Difference, SYFY Wire (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.syfy.com/syfywire/harry-
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Prophet edited by children around the globe.70 There are scores of unofficial 
Harry Potter parties, websites, books, and summer camps. Even the fictional 
pastime of the wizarding world, Quidditch, has been brought to life, with 
hundreds of real world Quidditch teams at high schools and universities 
around the globe competing for the chance to win the Quidditch World 
Cup.71 Students run on the field with brooms between their legs, and a hu-
man runner personifies the enchanted Snitch ball.72 It is not too fantastic to 
imagine that someday children enter college on a Quidditch scholarship.  
The Percy Jackson series of Greek mythological adventures by Rick 
Riordan spurred the emergence of summer camps where children could act 
the part of demigods.73 One of the most popular of such camps was initiated 
by the bookstore Book People in Austin, Texas.74 Kids from around the 
world apply to attend the real-world Camp Half-Blood.75 One camp director 
explained the goal of Camp Half-Blood: “We want [kids] to feel like they’ve 
lived inside their favorite book and have something to say as to what is hap-
pening in that world.”76 Campers make decisions within the framework of 
the stories that affect the ways the story unfolds.77 Though the camp has ac-
tors, a costume and wardrobe department, makeup and prosthetic effects, in 
the end, “[k]ids’ imaginations are their most important tool. Their ability to 
play and problem solve are their biggest assets out there.”78  
Marketing experts observe that “millennials—and people around the 
world—want[] an experience rather than possessions.”79 The goal of en-
trepreneurs today is to capitalize on this emerging experience economy. 
potter-alliance-real-dumbledores-army-using-their-passion-jk-rowlings-series-make [https://
perma.cc/YXW8-ZQDB]. 
 70. See Manohla Dargis & A.O. Scott, The Fans Own the Magic, N.Y. Times (July 1, 
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/movies/the-fans-are-all-right-for-harry-
potter.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 71. About, Int’l Quidditch Ass’n, http://iqaquidditch.org/about.html [https://
perma.cc/4764-LE64]; Chris Sosa, Real-Life Quidditch: No Flying, but Lots of Strategy, Tackling 
and Athleticism, Chi. Trib.: redeye (Nov. 18, 2016, 9:52 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.
com/redeye/redeye-how-quidditch-works-in-real-life-harry-potter-20161108-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/AD3Q-QPU7]. 
 72. Sosa, supra note 71. 
 73. See, e.g., Topher Bradfield, About Us, Camp Half-Blood, https://
bookpeoplecamphalfblood.wordpress.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/68DC-6ML6]. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Telephone Interview with Topher Bradfield, Children’s Outreach Coordinator & 
Literary Camp Dir., BookPeople (Aug. 19, 2012) (on file with author). 
 77. Bradfield, supra note 73. 
 78. Telephone Interview with Topher Bradfield, supra note 76. 
 79. Kim Slowey, How Amusement Features in Mixed-Use Projects Are Driving the ‘Expe-
rience Economy,’ Construction Dive (May 2, 2017), https://www.constructiondive.com/
news/how-amusement-features-in-mixed-use-projects-are-driving-the-experience-ec/441670/ 
[https://perma.cc/V8V5-Y8JP] (quoting Justin Beavis, co-founder of Urban Legacies).  
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Marketing experts Joseph Pine and James Gilmore first announced the 
emergence of the experience economy in the pages of the Harvard Business 
Review in 1998.80 They described this new economic mode as the next stage 
in economic progress, which they exemplified through the evolution of a 
birthday cake: from baking from scratch, to purchasing a Betty Crocker cake 
mix, to ordering a cake from a baker, and now to outsourcing the entire 
event to Chuck E. Cheese.81 They counseled businesses (and even cities) to 
remake themselves from offering goods and services to staging experiences 
that might engage all five senses.82 The cover of Pine and Gilmore’s subse-
quent book on the subject depicts tickets to experiences, suggesting the com-
ing commodification of life events.83 While Pine and Gilmore embrace the 
experience economy, the commodification raises questions: Will we have to 
buy tickets for everything we do? And who will control who can provide 
those experiences? 
The move to experience reflects many simultaneous technological and 
economic developments, including the rise of communications and trans-
portation technologies, as well as global supply chains that bring the raw ma-
terials needed for the experience within the reach of many. Pine and Gilmore 
observe that “[n]ew technologies . . . encourage whole new genres of experi-
ence, such as interactive games, Internet chat rooms and multi-player games, 
motion-based simulators, and virtual reality.”84 Of course, the technological 
basis of the modern experience economy goes beyond processing power. 
While it is easy to imagine enthusiasts offering homemade experiences to 
bring fantasies to life, even such experiences often are undergirded by con-
temporary technologies. Do-it-yourself (DIY) is empowered by obsessed and 
creative individuals who learn from YouTube instructional videos, purchase 
Etsy handicrafts, modify Alibaba and eBay mass merchandise, and interact 
with each other at specialized conventions. The Maker Movement “tap[s] 
into an American admiration for self-reliance and combine[s] that with 
open-source learning, contemporary design and powerful personal technol-
ogy like 3-D printers.”85 Social media helps circulate information, attracting 
both collaborators and consumers. 
 80. B. Joseph Pine II & James H. Gilmore, Welcome to the Experience Economy, Harv. 
Bus. Rev., Jul.–Aug. 1998, https://hbr.org/1998/07/welcome-to-the-experience-economy (on 
file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 81. Id. (“Now, in the time-starved 1990s, parents neither make the birthday cake nor 
even throw the party. Instead, they spend $100 or more to ‘outsource’ the entire event to 
Chuck E. Cheese’s, the Discovery Zone, the Mining Company, or some other business that 
stages a memorable event for the kids—and often throws in the cake for free.”). 
 82. See id. 
 83. See Pine & Gilmore, supra note 10. 
 84. Pine & Gilmore, supra note 80 (noting the “processing power required to render 
ever-more immersive experiences”). 
 85. Joan Voight, Which Big Brands Are Courting the Maker Movement, and Why: From 
Levi’s to Home Depot, Adweek (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/
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Personalized experiences delivered at a mass commercial scale are only 
economically feasible because of the rise of computing. Experiencing the 
Galaxy’s Edge will no doubt require that you wear a radio frequency identifi-
cation (RFID) chip, transmitting your identity and precise location to sen-
sors throughout the park, allowing computers to monitor and inform local 
engagements with you. Facial recognition will empower many of these expe-
riences.
The move toward “[s]imulated lived experience in cyberspace” places 
renewed emphasis on performance.86 “In cyberspace . . . one goes from 
watching the screen to going behind the screen and becoming the perfor-
mance.”87 Cyberspace theorist Randall Walser describes the move thusly: 
“[p]rint and radio tell; stage and film show; cyberspace embodies.”88
In short, whether delivered by multinational corporations to millions or 
by passionate individuals, experiences often rely on contemporary technolo-
gies. The key difference between the mass corporate scale and the passionate 
individual fan is not whether the experience is provided for a fee—both 
might have a cost, whether the experience is licensed or not. I turn to the law 
undergirding such licensing in the next Part. 
II. The Tenuous Merchandising Right
A commonplace assumption of the entertainment industry today is that 
intellectual property owners have an absolute right to fully exploit their cop-
yrights and trademarks in a variety of media well beyond film rights, includ-
ing toys, video games, theatrical plays, and theme parks.89 If anyone is play-
ing with a popular universe, they are doing so only at the sufferance of the 
copyright and trademark owner. Courts and laypeople alike seem to share a 
feeling “that authors should be granted the ability to control the use of their 
creations. They should have the right to mold the future of their characters, 




86. Rifkin, supra note 28, at 170.
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Randal Walser, Elements of a Cyberspace Playhouse, Nat’l Computer
Graphics Ass’n 1990 Conf. Proc. 403, 403 (on file with the Michigan Law Review)).
89. See 1 Thomas D. Selz et al., Entertainment Law: Legal Concepts and Busi-
ness Practices § 3:33 (3d ed. 2017) (focusing on “Need to control rights in multiple media 
and multiple territories—Multiple media—Potential revenues—Derivative media revenue”). 
For a critical appraisal of this emergent right, see generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 36, at 
479–80, 506, who complain that trademark owners “act as though the merchandising theory is 
a fait accompli.”
90. Kurtz, supra note 38, at 437.
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But is there any limit? Should the hundreds of handmade items inspired 
by Harry Potter sold on Etsy be illegal in order to preserve Warner Bros.’ ex-
clusive right to merchandise goods? Warner Bros. shut down a shop called 
Whimsic Alley in Los Angeles, California, calling the shop’s fake “Great 
Hall” and hosting of Harry Potter parties trademark infringement.91 Can 
Warner Bros. shut down real world Quidditch leagues around the world, and 
the unofficial purveyors of brooms, costumes, and other supplies for these 
games? What about book stores or the Girl Scouts who hold Harry Potter–
themed summer camps? 
Fan activity potentially implicates several rights of a copyright owner, 
from the reproduction right, to the right to make and control derivative 
works, to the right of public performance. Owners of trademarks argue that 
unlicensed merchants are freeriding, profiting from brands built by others. 
Trademark owners have still other concerns: if an adult engages in lewd be-
havior while wearing an unauthorized Tigger costume, Disney fears the 
brand will be tarnished.92
Neither the Lanham Act nor the Copyright Act mention any distinct 
merchandising right. Rather, the so-called “merchandising right” is a crea-
ture of the common law, cobbled together by lower courts in cases and rest-
ing on both trademark and copyright. The following Sections trace the rise 
of this right, demonstrating both its uncertain foundations and its seemingly 
boundless scope.
A. Trademark
The lucrative licensing deals of Warner Bros. for Harry Potter merchan-
dise and Lucasfilm for Star Wars paraphernalia rely primarily—yet uneasi-
ly—on a series of federal circuit court trademark decisions from the 1980s. 
As we shall see, many of these decisions are myopically driven by courts’ 
concern for the potential economic value of the trademark properties. Rather 
than focus on consumer confusion, the traditional concern of trademark, 
these decisions ground a new so-called merchandising right on a circular 
reasoning often characterized as “if value, then right,” the misconceived idea 
that where there is potential economic value a legal right should follow.
This Section reviews the birth of the merchandising right in trademark 
to shed light on potential future expansions of these laws to cover fan-based 
activity that is currently “tolerated” by IP owners and allowed to thrive li-
91. Daniel Miller, Whimsic Alley, the Store Sued by Warner Bros. over Its ‘Harry Potter’ 
Wares, Is Closing, L.A. Times (July 20, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/holly
wood/la-fi-ct-whimsic-alley-closing-20170718-story.html [https://perma.cc/3YH4-8G4T].
92. See Associated Press, Cookie Monster, Elmo: Monster Behavior in Times Square?,
USA Today (Apr. 9, 2013, 6:37 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/04/
09/cookie-monster-elmo-times-square-trouble/2069037/ [https://perma.cc/J33R-JN26] (de-
scribing inappropriate activities among people who dress up as characters, from Elmo to Hello 
Kitty, to make a few extra dollars with tourists in Times Square).
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cense-free. As we shall see, courts did not always recognize near absolute 
rights to manufacture toys based on popular entertainment properties.
In the 1977 case of Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Products,93 Lucasfilms and 
its licensee, Kenner, sued Ideal Toy for making “Star Team” action-figure 
dolls similar in concept and appearance to Star Wars characters Darth 
Vader, C-3PO, and R2-D2. The court held that because the “Star Team” 
dolls were dissimilar in appearance from the Star Wars action figures, and 
because Ideal Toy used different trade names for its dolls and not trade-
marked names such as “Darth Vader” or “R2-D2,” there was no likelihood of 
consumer confusion as to either source or sponsorship.94 Most notably, Ideal 
Toy prevailed even though it admitted to seeking to cash in on the star toy 
fad, a fad undoubtedly spurred by the Star Wars movies.95 In this sense, the 
“Star Team” manufacturers were freeriding on the efforts of others—and the 
court abided this. The court allowed the company to compete in this area so 
long as its products were not likely to confuse consumers.
This approach, allowing competition in the manufacture of toys inspired 
by popular children’s stories, did not last long. In the 1980s, Warner Bros. 
wrangled in a series of disputes with manufacturers of unlicensed toy cars 
similar in appearance to the “General Lee,” the car featured in Warner Bros.’ 
popular television series The Dukes of Hazzard. Defendant Gay Toys manu-
factured a toy car called the “Dixie Racer,” which was a bright orange Dodge 
Charger with a confederate flag decal and the numerals 10 on the door (the 
original General Lee was nearly identical but had the numerals 01 on the 
door).96 The federal district court in Manhattan denied plaintiff’s motion for 
a preliminary injunction, saying that purchasers of the toy car did not care 
whether the car was sponsored by the producer of the television show or 
not—kids just wanted a car that looked like the General Lee to enhance their 
play.97 Parents, too, the lower court opined, likely cared little about Warner 
Bros.’ endorsement,98 preferring instead “the lower prices presumably made 
93. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of Gen. Mills. Fun Grp., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 291 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
94. Id. at 303–04, 309.
95. Id. at 304.
96. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.), rev’g 513 F. Supp. 1066 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
97. Id. at 78. A problematic aspect of the district court’s decision was its argument that 
children do not care about a toy’s sponsorship—they just want the toy. See Warner Bros, Inc. v. 
Gay Toys, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1018, 1019 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983). As 
the appeals court rightly noted, consumers need not know the name of the source of any par-
ticular product or service. Warner Bros, Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 332–34. The key is 
whether they believe a product or service comes from a single source. Id. This is known as the 
“anonymous source” doctrine in trademark law.
98. Warner Bros., 513 F. Supp. at 1068–69.
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available by unlimited competition and the elimination of the producer’s 
royalty.”99
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.100 The appellate 
court’s decision was driven largely by its concern to preserve Warner Bros.’ 
lucrative licensing program. “Warner Bros. has licensed other toy manufac-
turers to produce authorized replicas of the ‘General Lee,’ ” the court ob-
served.101 It added that “this was not only the custom and practice of the in-
dustry, but also that product licensing arrangements were ultimately more 
profitable than the T.V. series itself.”102 The court was up front in its con-
cerns about the potential economic value of exclusive licenses for Warner 
Bros., stating that Warner Bros. “has a substantial financial interest at 
stake . . . . If the injunction is denied, Warner Bros. and its licensees will suf-
fer substantial lost sales, and its licensing program will lose much of the con-
fidence reposed in it by the licensees, who also made substantial investments 
based upon the exclusivity of their licenses.”103
The appeals court emphasized the crux of Gay Toys’ wrong as unjust en-
richment and unfair competition. Citing the 1918 Supreme Court case of In-
ternational News Service v. Associated Press, which enjoined a competitor of 
the Associated Press on a theory of freeriding,104 the Second Circuit in 
Warner Bros. concluded that “[t]o deny Warner Bros. injunctive relief would 
be to enable Gay Toys ‘to reap where [i]t has not sown.’ ”105 Gay Toys had 
“deliberately utilized these [car] symbols to capitalize on the demand created 
by ‘The Dukes of Hazzard’ and the ‘General Lee,’ ” the court opined, “in or-
der to divert business and increase its sales by misleading consumers as to 
the source and sponsorship of the ‘Dixie Racer.’ ”106 Indeed, copying the look 
of the General Lee paid off—Gay Toys sold over 500,000 of these toy cars, 
with a backorder of 700,000 more—well over the sales of the same Dodge 
Charger toy car before the company had changed its look to resemble the 
General Lee.107 Drawing upon the reasoning of Warner Bros., the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a permanent injunction against a separate 
unlicensed manufacturer of a General Lee look-alike on similar grounds.108
In so doing, both circuit courts adopted a rebuttable presumption that “[i]n 
instances of intentional copying the second comer is generally presumed to 
99. See Warner Bros., 553 F. Supp. at 1020 n.4.
100. Warner Bros., 658 F.2d 76.
101. Id. at 79.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 248 U.S. 215, 239–40 (1918).
105. Warner Bros., 658 F.2d at 80 (quoting Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 239) (second al-
teration in original).
106. Id. at 78.
107. Id.
108. Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1982).
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have intended to create a confusing similarity of appearance and to have 
succeeded in doing so.”109
The reasoning regarding likelihood of confusion is circular. Where the 
federal district court in Manhattan in Warner Bros. found no evidence that 
purchasers of the toy cars were likely confused as to source, the Second Cir-
cuit’s rebuttable presumption helps to ensure that purchasers will be con-
fused about sponsorship in the future. Now that toys must be licensed, pur-
chasers will presume them to be licensed, and they will be confused when 
toys are not.110
Freeriding is a justification for another emergent trademark claim: ini-
tial interest confusion. Under this theory, a defendant is held liable for get-
ting one’s foot in the door with potential customers by appealing to consum-
ers’ interest in plaintiff’s brand, even when there is no confusion about 
sponsorship at the point of sale.111 Unlicensed merchandise may constitute 
initial interest confusion, creating an initial impression of sponsorship or 
endorsement.
Notably, the federal district court in the Warner Bros. litigation sought 
repeatedly to consider both the effects on competition and on children’s 
play. “Successful children’s television programs usually produce an intense 
desire among their viewers to act out the parts of characters in the televised 
dramas,”112 the court observed. “This, in turn, creates a market for toys 
which would assist the children in pursuing their fantasies.”113 The court was 
not convinced that in light of this phenomenon of children wanting to play 
with toys related to their favorite stories that the “television producer should 
be entitled—in addition to whatever direct revenue it may obtain by selling 
its program to networks and independent stations—to exploit such demand 
for toy imitations by restricting their distribution to its own licensees.”114 For 
its part, Gay Toys “did no more than openly assert a right to share in what-
ever market may have been created by the success of plaintiff’s television 
109. Id. at 857.
110. The First Circuit adopted the rebuttable presumption in Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sul-
livan, 867 F.2d 22, 35 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[W]hen a manufacturer intentionally used another’s 
mark as a means of establishing a link in consumers’ minds with the other’s enterprise, and 
directly profits from that link, there is an unmistakable aura of deception.”). Again, the court 
decried that defendants “obtain a ‘free ride’ at plaintiff’s expense.” Id. at 33. Putting a contem-
porary spin on the famous language from International News v. Associated Press stating that 
defendants should not be permitted to “reap where [they have] not sown,” id. (quoting Int’l 
News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918)), the court stated that in this case, al-
lowing defendants to profit from selling unlicensed “Boston Marathon” t-shirts was akin to 
“be[ing] given a medal without having run the course.” Id.
111. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
112. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1018, 1019 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 724 
F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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show.”115 But the district court’s hands were tied, since the appellate court 
established a rebuttable presumption finding confusion where defendants 
intentionally copied plaintiff’s mark.116 The district court read the higher 
court’s opinion as conclusively “adopting the position that a television pro-
ducer is entitled to monopolize any market created by the popularity of its 
shows.”117
The intuition underlying the appellate courts’ rebuttable presumption is 
that intentional copying ought to be punished. Yet, this reasoning has been 
expressly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in the trademark context. As 
the Court stated in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., “In gen-
eral, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright pro-
tects an item, it will be subject to copying.”118 The Court expressly recog-
nized the benefits of copying outside of the legal protections offered by 
copyright and patent laws, acknowledging that “[a]llowing competitors to 
copy will have salutary effects in many instances.”119 Copyright and patent 
laws prohibit copying expressions and inventions for limited duration with a 
public interest goal in mind: incentivizing innovation. But legislatures have 
determined that outside the limited confines of copyright and patent, com-
petition—which thrives on copying120—ought to be the norm. Trademark 
protection, which potentially can last forever, is tailored to a wholly different 
public goal: the prevention of consumer confusion and the efficient func-
tioning of markets. Outside of consumer confusion, trademark law seeks to 
promote efficient markets, which includes fair competition. 
In an important critique of the emergent merchandising right, Stacey 
Dogan and Mark Lemley respond to the idea that every benefit to be derived 
from a first-comer’s market should be enjoined as unjust enrichment. “[T]he 
world is full of free riding,”121 they observe. Dogan and Lemley argue that the 
merchandising decisions stray too far from trademark’s traditional public 
policy concern: consumer confusion.122 Some acknowledge the merchandis-
ing right is far afield of traditional trademark rights, but say the trademark 
115. Id. at 1020.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1021 (emphasis added).
118. 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
119. TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 29.
120. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, The Joys of Copyright, 30 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 477, 
481 (1983) (“[C]ompetition is copying . . . .”); Robert C. Denicola, Freedom To Copy, 108 Yale
L.J. 1661, 1661 (1999) (“[L]aws that restrain copying . . . restrain competition.”).
121. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 36, at 480.
122. See id. at 482–83 (commenting that such reasoning “has no logical stopping point” if 
the underlying motive is to prohibit “free riding”); see also Kurtz, supra note 38, at 505 (“[N]ot 
every use of another’s creation is wrongful or ‘unjust.’ A system that allows the non-confusing 
copying and exploitation of another’s creations may achieve greater social utility and economic 
value than a system that forbids such activities.”).
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owner has a better claim than anyone else to own the merchandising right.123
This reasoning fails to account for the social benefits of limiting control and 
allowing for a competitive market in ancillary products. Where there is no 
confusion, customers will benefit from competition, which leads to greater 
choice, higher quality products, new potential markets, and lower prices.124
Allowing competition and access to ancillary markets has still other benefits. 
As Brett Frischman and Mark Lemley describe, there are many salutary ef-
fects of “[s]pillovers—uncompensated benefits that one person’s activity 
provides to another,” which I argue in the next Part include follow-on learn-
ing, expansion of human imagination, freedom, and sociability.125
There is another important argument to consider in the context of 
trademarks in merchandise that enhances the ability of individuals, especial-
ly children, to put themselves into fantasy worlds. In many of these cases, the 
brand does not serve to identify the source of the product, but is the product 
itself. Kids want a wand to play Harry Potter, and they or their parents may 
not care about the sponsorship of the wand at all. In these cases, the brand 
may be “aesthetically functional,” and it would unduly harm competition to 
recognize an exclusive right in the mark in such cases.126 To be sure, some 
will want to pay more for an “authentic” experience. But does this mean that 
others should be prohibited from offering competing goods at cheaper pric-
es? As Dogan and Lemley argue, recognizing trademark rights in these con-
texts has pernicious effects on competition and expressive liberties, as cus-
tomers seek to express themselves through the brands they wear and use.127
The doctrine of aesthetic functionality, however, has become a controversial 
one because if applied too liberally, it threatens to undermine trademark 
protection altogether.128 “It would mean that simply because a consumer 
123. See Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandis-
ing of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 603, 604, 641 (1984).
124. Dogan and Lemley conjecture that the Supreme Court, if it were to confront the le-
gitimacy of an absolute merchandising right, would reject it based on this reasoning, as the 
Court has recently affirmed that trademark law should not be used to stifle competition or 
even copying, which is the subject matter of copyright and patent, not trademark. See Dogan & 
Lemley, supra note 36, at 465 & n.14.
125. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 257, 258 
(2007); see also Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L.
Rev. 1031, 1057 (2005) (“The broader the scope of an intellectual property right, the less room 
there is for new innovators to develop and market new products, because the law itself restricts 
that competition.”).
126. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 36, at 502–05 (discussing aesthetic functionality of 
brands that are products themselves rather than merely source identifiers).
127. Id. at 500 (“When fans buy Harvard shirts, Chicago Cubs hats, Rolling Stones tat-
toos, or Winnie the Pooh cakes from the local bakery, they are doing so not because they be-
lieve that . . . the . . . trademark holders made or sponsored the goods, but because the trade-
mark in this context serves an important communicative function for them.”).
128. In Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 457 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 
2006), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court decision that had held the 
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likes a trademark, or finds it aesthetically pleasing, a competitor could adopt 
and use the mark on its own products. Thus, a competitor could adopt the 
distinctive Mercedes circle and tri-point star or the well-known golden arch-
es of McDonald’s, all under the rubric of aesthetic functionality.”129 Given 
the difficulty of cabining this doctrine, I propose trademark fair use as a bet-
ter doctrine for limiting the extent of trademark monopolies over secondary 
fan markets.130
In short: the ever-expanding merchandising right rests on judicial inter-
pretations extending trademark rights dramatically based largely on either a 
Lockean impulse131 or the circular view that these rights are valuable and 
thus must be protected. These decisions are driven more by concerns for 
corporate profit than the public interest. Where trademark is supposed to 
protect consumers, the merchandise right has been designed to protect a cer-
tain category of merchants. As Dogan and Lemley conclude, “a nonconfu-
sion-based merchandising right promotes no legitimate policy goal and im-
poses significant economic and expressive costs, and therefore should be 
abandoned.”132 This Article agrees with these prescient critiques of an expan-
sive merchandising right. The time is ripe for lawmakers to consider the 
economic and social effects of an overly broad merchandising right and to 
scale back the right where its costs cannot be justified.
In addition to consumer confusion, trademark law protects a mark from 
the dilution of its distinctive meaning and the loss of consumer goodwill. 
The doctrine of dilution by blurring protects the uniqueness of a mark and 
its ability to immediately, strongly signal the source of a product. Because 
trademark owners can lose a mark for failing to police it, more trademark 
owners may be tempted to use dilution by blurring to prevent unlicensed us-
es of protected characters and settings, on the ground that such use will 
weaken the association between the characters and the intellectual property 
owner.
Another potential claim is dilution by tarnishment. In HIT Entertain-
ment, Inc. v. National Discount Costume Co., various owners of copyrights 
and trademarks in the children’s television characters Barney, Bob the Build-
er, and Thomas the Tank Engine sued a discount costume manufacturer for 
copyright and trademark violations of character appearances and names.133
The plaintiffs argued that they intentionally did not license adult costumes 
for these characters for fear that one of these adults would engage in inap-
logos of Volkswagen and Audi to be aesthetically functional because customers desired these 
logos regardless of the source of the products. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, arguing that 
“[a]ccepting Auto Gold’s position would be the death knell for trademark protection.” Id. at 
1064.
129. Id.
130. See infra Section IV.A.
131. See generally Robert P. Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property (2011).
132. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 36, at 478.
133. 552 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
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propriate behavior while wearing the costume, thus jeopardizing the good-
will associated with the characters.134 The federal district court found no evi-
dence that purchasers of the costumes used them to provide children’s enter-
tainment, and thus rejected plaintiffs claim that such uses constitute unfair 
competition.135 Furthermore, the court did not find that the costumes in-
fringed plaintiff’s copyright or trademarks because they were too dissimilar 
from the protected characters.136 But the court went on to permanently en-
join the costume manufacturer’s use of trademarked names—”Barney,” “Bob 
the Builder” and “Thomas,” to describe the costumes in their catalogues on 
the familiar theory that such use was likely to cause confusion as to the spon-
sorship of the costumes.137 Notably, the court was so caught up with con-
cerns about unjust enrichment and freeriding on the trademarked names 
that it failed to consider one of the basic trademark infringement defenses, 
nominative use.138 If the costume manufacturer has a right to copy otherwise 
copyrighted and trademarked costumes, how else can it refer to these cos-
tumes without using their trade names?
Copyright and trademark owners in fantasy worlds geared toward chil-
dren frequently ground their claims for absolute control over their proper-
ties on the goal of protecting children. J.K. Rowling, while allowing a great 
deal of fan-created fiction stories and art inspired by the Harry Potter series 
to flourish on the internet, has expressed concern about sexually explicit ma-
terial that may attract and disturb young children.139 While these concerns 
may be valid, trademark and copyright laws are not the proper tools for po-
licing against unsavory uses. Absolute rights to control all adult use of chil-
dren’s literature tramples on First Amendment and other human rights to 
enjoy and participate in culture. As I explore in the next Section, children 
and adults alike inhabit cultural universes. Although many of these fictional 
universes are geared toward children, they are not exclusively reserved for 
them. Star Wars is equally if not more popular among adult fans. A trade-
mark argument can be made that the mark loses its distinctiveness through 
134. HIT Entm’t, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1102. Lyrick Studios, Inc., the producer of the televi-
sion show Barney & Friends, has engaged in an extensive campaign to prevent people from 
dressing in unauthorized Barney costumes. In the words of Lyrick’s general counsel, “We’re 
afraid that someone presenting himself as Barney could get a child to do something inappro-
priate.” Pamela Manson, A Super D-Duper Job, Tex. Law., Feb. 4, 2002, at 5, LexisNexis.
135. HIT Entm’t, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
136. Id. at 1105, 1107.
137. Id. at 1106–07. In another case, involving a skit where a man dressed in a chicken 
costume beat up another dressed as Barney, a federal district court found no trademark viola-
tion in the unauthorized use of the Barney costume because there was no likelihood of confu-
sion as to source, and no copyright violation, reasoning that the chicken skit was a fair use par-
ody. Lyons P’ship v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947, 953 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 332–337.
139. Darren Waters, Rowling Backs Potter Fan Fiction, BBC (May 27, 2004, 12:11 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3753001.stm [https://perma.cc/K7PV-EGS9].
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tarnishing association with what might be considered unwholesome behav-
ior. However, efforts to regulate speech activities to protect children have of-
ten been struck down by the Supreme Court as impermissibly broaching up-
on the defendants’ First Amendment rights.140
Recently, for the first time ever, the Supreme Court has directly invali-
dated a provision of the federal trademark statute on First Amendment 
grounds. In Matal v. Tam, the Court held that the disparagement clause un-
der Lanham Act section 2a, which barred protection of trademarks that may 
“ ‘disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute’ any ‘persons, living 
or dead,’ ” violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.141 In 
Tam, an all-Asian rock band, The Slants, had been denied a federal trade-
mark registration in the band name on the ground that “slant” is a derogato-
ry term for Asians and on the belief that the name would offend many 
Asians.142 Ironically, the band had sought to use the name as a term of em-
powerment, reappropriating a racial slur to diminish its intended impact.143
The band leader, Simon Tam, challenged the trademark office’s denial of the 
registration on the ground that the law did not recognize the nuanced nature 
of the speech intended.144
The Court in Tam rejected the argument that the government through 
its trademark law could seek to prevent “ ‘underrepresented groups’ from 
being ‘bombarded with demeaning messages in commercial advertising,’ ”
holding that protection of hateful and offensive speech lies at the core of 
First Amendment protected speech.145 The Court held that the disparage-
ment clause “offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not 
be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”146 It was an un-
intended result for Tam, who has supported Native American groups’ long-
running effort to deny federal trademark protection for the Washington 
140. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (affirming that the district court 
appropriately granted a preliminary injunction staying the enforcement of the Child Online 
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (affirming that the district 
court appropriately granted a preliminary injunction staying the enforcement of the Commu-
nications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223).
141. 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (alterations in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) 
(2012)).
142. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1754.
143. Id. at 1751.
144. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
145. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (quoting Brief for the Petitioner at 48, Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 
(No. 15-1293)). The Court further states, “Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, 
gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast 
of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we 
hate.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing)).
146. Id. at 1751.
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Redskins’ trademark on disparagement grounds,147 that Native American 
challengers and the Department of Justice withdrew all their pending claims 
to revoke the Redskins trademark after the Court’s decision invalidating the 
disparagement clause altogether.148
Tam leaves vulnerable many other provisions of the Lanham Act, in-
cluding another prohibition under section 2a against registration of “im-
moral or scandalous” marks;149 section 2c barring registration of “a name, 
portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual [without con-
sent]” or of “a deceased president of the United States during the life of his 
widow [without consent of the widow]”;150 and the federal statute’s antidilu-
tion protection against marks that dilute or tarnish a famous mark.151 I con-
sider the implications of Matal on merchandising rights in fan activity in-
spired by fantasy worlds in Part IV.152
B. Copyright
Copyright in expressive works—from literature to films to developed 
characters to cartoons and video games—includes rights to control repro-
duction, public performance of a work and the right to control and profit 
from derivative works based on the original.153
1. 106(1): The Reproduction Right154
In recent years, some courts have grounded protection for copyright 
owners over cultural merchandising in the reproduction right. There is cop-
147. See Amanda Whiting, 5 Questions for Simon Tam, Founder of The Slants, Washing-
tonian (June 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonian.com/2016/06/21/5-questions-simon-tam-
founder-slants-supreme-court-redskins/ [https://perma.cc/BMG3-HHEN].
148. Ian Shapira & Ann E. Marimow, Washington Redskins Win Trademark Fight Over 
the Team’s Name, Wash. Post (June 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-
safety/2017/06/29/a26f52f0-5cf6-11e7-9fc6-c7ef4bc58d13_story.html [https://perma.cc/9V7M-
H8WP].
149. See, e.g., In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (rejecting as “immoral or scandal-
ous” the name “COCK SUCKER” for rooster-shaped lollipops, on the grounds that the mark is 
“vulgar,” “shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety,” and “offensive”). The Federal 
Circuit has already applied Matal v. Tam in a case where trademark registration for apparel 
called “FUCT” had been previously denied because it was “scandalous and immoral.” See In re
Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017). In the latest appeal, the Federal Circuit held the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s rejection must be reversed. Id. at 1357.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) (2012).
151. Id. § 1125(c). As Rebecca Tushnet has argued, once the Court invalidates the dispar-
agement clause under the First Amendment, “it will face a difficult job distinguishing other 
aspects of trademark law.” Rebecca Tushnet, The First Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trade-
mark Regulation and Free Speech, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 381, 383 (2016).
152. See infra notes 317–318.
153. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
154. Id. § 106(1).
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yright infringement if defendant’s dolls, toys, or products are “substantially 
similar” to the plaintiff’s protected work. According to one scholar’s close 
account of character-based merchandise licensing in the 1970s and 1980s, 
the courts took a more critical view of “substantial similarity” early on but 
gave way to a more loose interpretation of substantial similarity by the 
1980s.155 Recall the case of Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Products involving the 
Star Team dolls meant to evoke Star Wars action figures. In addition to the 
trademark claims discussed above, the court in that case considered whether 
the “Star Team” toys violated the copyright in Star Wars characters Darth 
Vader, C-3PO, and R2-D2.156 The court noted that while visual and three-
dimensional depictions of a literary character could vary, in this case, the 
films themselves presented highly developed depictions—albeit two-
dimensional—of the characters at issue.157 The court held that the defend-
ants’ “Star Team” dolls were not substantially similar to the plaintiff’s pro-
tected Star Wars properties.158 In contrast, in Universal City Studios v. J.A.R. 
Sales, a federal district court in California found that an unauthorized “E.T.”
doll—based on the title character from plaintiff’s film, E.T. the Extra-
Terrestrial—was substantially similar to the plaintiff’s copyrighted charac-
ter.159
Early courts’ focus on “substantial similarity” grounded the merchandis-
ing analysis under copyright law on traditional principles.160 But in a detailed 
examination of copyright law dealing with character merchandising from the 
1970s to the mid-1980s, Leslie Kurtz observed that courts began shifting 
away from this traditional focus on substantial similarity between plaintiff’s
and defendant’s goods to focus merely on the copyrightability of the charac-
ter itself.161 As Kurtz notes, if courts found a particular character was suffi-
ciently delineated to warrant copyright protection, this often led to a finding 
of copyright infringement regardless of whether defendant’s use was sub-
stantially similar.162 In Universal City Studios v. Kamar Industries, Inc., for 
instance, plaintiff producers of the film, E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial, sued the 
manufacturers of mugs with the words “I Love You, E.T.” and “E.T. Phone 
Home.”163 The court held that E.T. was a highly developed fictional character 
and that the mugs likely violated Universal’s copyright in E.T.—even though 
the mugs just mentioned the name “E.T.” and included no picture of the 
character.164 “Focusing on the character’s copyrightability, the court failed to 
155. See Kurtz, supra note 38, at 495–506.
156. 443 F. Supp. 291, 302–05 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
157. See Ideal Toy, 443 F. Supp. at 302–03.
158. Id. at 305.
159. 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
160. See Kurtz, supra note 38, at 440, 512.
161. Id. at 440.
162. See id. at 472.
163. 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1162 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
164. Universal City Studios, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1165–66.
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analyze the substantiality of what the defendant had copied,” Kurtz writes, 
noting, too, that character names are not copyrightable.165 As Kurtz points 
out, trademark, not copyright, was the appropriate doctrine under which the 
case should have been decided.166 The implications of this case are broad—
unmoored from a traditional focus on “substantial similarity,” courts can en-
join as copyright violation any evocation of a copyrighted character.
2. 106(2): Derivative Works
The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as one “based upon one or 
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, drama-
tization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art repro-
duction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may 
be recast, transformed, or adapted.”167 But what about fan activity such as 
themed dinner parties?
In a recent analysis of the purpose and scope of the derivative work 
right, Pamela Samuelson argues the right should be limited to extend to “the 
nine examples” enumerated by the statute and “close analogues.”168 Under 
this analysis, we need to ask: How analogous are the fan activities described 
here to the derivative works enumerated in the statute? Samuelson categorizes 
the Act’s nine enumerated derivative works into three groups: “shorter ver-
sions,” “faithful renditions,” and “transformations of expressions from one 
medium or genre to another.”169 A theme park akin to the Wizarding World 
in Orlando, which offers an exact replica of Hogsmeade Village and Hog-
wart’s Castle as depicted in the copyrighted Harry Potter films by Warner 
Bros., may comprise a “faithful rendition” of the films that is “substantially 
similar” to the original films. At the same time, a theme park may be consid-
ered a useful article falling outside the scope of copyright protection; this 
doctrine may also confound copyright in toys.170 But as we have seen, courts 
have recognized expansive copyright interests in popular cultural items171
165. Kurtz, supra note 38, at 460–62.
166. Id. at 462.
167. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “derivative work”).
168. Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative 
Work Right, 101 Geo. L.J. 1505 (2013).
169. Id. at 1518–20.
170. Id. at 1534–35 (“An important statutory limit on the scope of the derivative work 
right is the exclusion from copyright protection of designs of useful articles (for example, 
chairs, bicycles, clothing).”).
171. Justice Holmes’s opinion in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 
(1903), opened the door early on to copyright protection in kitsch. The case involved copy-
rightability in circus poster advertisements. Holmes articulated the nondiscrimination princi-
pal: “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and 
most obvious limits.” Id. at 251. Combined with an already low bar for originality, under Feist 
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and in articles that either depict or refer to copyrighted characters. Further-
more, protection of the clearly expressive elements of these useful articles 
would be protected under the U.S. Supreme Court’s recently articulated two-
part test for copyright in useful articles, elaborated in the 2017 case of Star 
Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.172  
Dinner parties and camps may qualify as transformations of the original 
work from one medium to another. Such a dinner party might include mak-
ing real the literary depictions of food, settings, and scenes from the books, 
as well as copying these from the film versions of the books. At the same 
time, however, the unscripted aspects of the parties, which would not have a 
“high degree of expected fidelity”173 to the originals, arguably push these ac-
tivities outside the scope of the derivative work right. So too does the fact 
that “derivatives generally involve the fixation of a second work in tangible 
form.”174  
In a highly publicized case, Warner Bros. sued a Harry Potter fan, Steve 
Vander Ark, for publishing an unauthorized “A to Z” reference guide of all 
things Harry Potter.175 The court held that reference books are not analogous 
to any of the nine enumerated categories of works defined as derivative 
works in the Copyright Act, stating that “the market for reference guides to 
the Harry Potter works is not exclusively [Rowling’s] to exploit or license.”176 
Samuelson argues that “courts should be skeptical of novel derivative work 
claims,”177 analyzing them for analogousness to the nine enumerated catego-
ries in the statute. Samuelson notes multiple interests to consider when de-
termining whether novel uses are derivative works under the statute, includ-
ing balancing the foreseeable incentive interests of copyright owners and 
concern to prevent unjust enrichment to the autonomy and expressive inter-
ests of new speakers, competition, ongoing innovation, and even the person-
al property rights of owners of copies.178 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), this justified copyright in 
mundane objects. 
 172. 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1033 (2017) (“[A]n artistic feature of the design of a useful article is 
eligible for copyright protection if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or three-
dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or in some other medium if imagined 
separately from the useful article.”). 
 173. Samuelson, supra note 168, at 1521. 
 174. Id. at 1522. 
 175. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 176. Id. at 550. The court expressed concern, however, that Vander Ark’s guide exces-
sively copied verbatim descriptions from the original Potter books. Id. at 547. The case settled 
when RDR Books agreed to rephrase the book so as to steer clear of violating section 106(1) of 
the Act. See Out-Law.com, Harry Potter Lexicon Published After Judgment-Guided Edit, Regis-
ter (Feb. 3, 2009, 2:57 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/02/03/potter_lexicon/ 
[https://perma.cc/LY2T-CYT4]. 
 177. Samuelson, supra note 168, at 1527. 
 178. Id. at 1527–33. 
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3. 106(4): The Public Performance Right
Section 106(4) of the Copyright Act also includes the right to enjoin un-
licensed public performances of certain works.179 A performance can include 
a reading or dramatic enactment of a literary work, a live musical perfor-
mance, screening of a film, playing a recorded piece of music, or singing 
copyrighted songs.180 A public performance may also be a derivative work.181
Private performances do not violate the Copyright Act; to come within the 
ambit of this right, the performance must reach outside one’s family or circle 
of friends.182 Thus, while singing a copyrighted tune in the shower is fine, 
singing copyrighted songs with a large group may run afoul of this right—
which makes the parameters of this right infamously broad. 
A heavy-handed effort to go after Girl Scouts for singing campfire songs 
resulted in laws that currently permit small businesses to pipe in broadcast 
radio and television royalty-free. In the 1990s, the American Society of 
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) sent letters demanding that 
some 250 Girl Scout camps across the country pay license fees to sing songs 
such as “Puff the Magic Dragon” and “Over the Rainbow” around the camp-
fire.183 One Scout group was so worried about the possibility of being sued 
that it taught its campers to dance the Macarena sans music.184 One reporter 
describes the resulting outcry: “As footage of the silent Macarena appeared 
on television news programs across the country, ASCAP descended into 
what its public relations consultant . . . described as ‘PR hell.’ ”185
ASCAP was shamed into backing down. But did its actions cross a legal 
line? The question has yet to be answered by a court. In the meantime, a host 
of other popular activities, from “flash mobs”186 to Karaoke to lip-synced 
videos posted to YouTube to book-themed summer camps lie uncomforta-
bly in a gray area, potentially violating several rights of copyright owners.
179. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012).
180. See id. § 101.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. N.Y. Times News Serv., Girl Scouts Are Free to Sing Again; ASCAP’s Bid to Levy 




185. Id. The timing was terrible for ASCAP, which had been lobbying Congress to force 
small businesses and restaurants to pay royalties for playing music. Backlash from the “silent 
Macarena” led Congress to pass the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, which increased
the number of bars and restaurants exempt from royalties. See Fairness in Music Licensing Act 
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. II, 112 Stat. 2827, 2923–34 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C.).
186. The “flash mob” refers to the practice of large groups assembling suddenly in a pub-
lic place to perform a dance in sync together. The flash mob is intended to surprise onlookers, 
and they are often organized through social networking sites.
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C. Battle Royale: Cease and Desist 
To date, much of fan activity appears to take place without licenses, per-
haps outside even the shadow of the law. Thus far, the owners of copyrights 
and trademarks in popular fantasy worlds have largely condoned or tolerat-
ed fan activity.187 One might suggest two rationales for why IP owners have 
refrained from suing those engaged in such cultural activities based on their 
works: first, these activities increase the demand for their commodities, and 
drive a more impassioned fan base; second, sending cease-and-desist letters 
can quickly turn fans’ love into anger.188  
But as the value of the experience economy grows, the pressure to fully 
exploit intellectual properties—and to do so exclusively by barring others 
from doing so—will mount. Marketing experts ruthlessly advise companies 
that “more experiences should yield transformations,” and that companies 
“should charge for . . . life-changing . . . experiences.”189 With transformative 
experiences, they observe, “the customer is the product.”190 As corporations 
face pressure to monetize all their assets fully, they will increasingly assert 
rights over the use of their intellectual properties. They will seek to exploit 
them fully themselves, but go further to order others to cease and desist from 
engaging in activity that involves their intellectual properties. The commodi-
fication of experience will mean that individuals increasingly face a difficult 
choice: cease their play using intellectual property claimed by others, pay on 
the rare occasion they are offered a license, or remain vulnerable to a lawsuit 
that many do not have the resources to fight. 
Much fan activity thus exists at the sufferance of intellectual property 
holders, with the possibility that it might be ended with one short letter.191 
The effect is that many today carry on in a legal grey zone—with the sword 
of Damocles hanging overhead in the form of a cease-and-desist letter that 
might fall. 
Indeed, we see recent efforts to assert claims over people who seek to of-
fer experiences that draw upon the intellectual property of others. As the 
failed effort to silence the Girl Scouts singing “Puff the Magic Dragon”192 
demonstrated, intellectual property holders are not necessarily shy of attack-
ing even individuals and groups likely to elicit public sympathy. The de-
mands to cease such activity follow the old, refuted logic: “If value, then 
 187. See Wu, supra note 14. 
 188. See id. 
 189. Pine & Gilmore, supra note 10, at xvi (emphasis omitted). 
 190. Id. at 297. 
 191. The craft marketplace Etsy, for example, has experienced a variety of approaches 
that trademark owners take toward third-party crafts employing their marks. See Caroline 
McCarthy, Etsy’s Crafty Balance: Fans vs. Trademark Holders, CNET (Oct. 27, 2010, 2:59 PM), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/etsys-crafty-balance-fans-vs-trademark-holders/ [https://perma.
cc/Q2QD-LZUP]. 
 192. See supra notes 183–185 and accompanying text. 
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right.” Rochelle Dreyfuss first offered this pithy formulation,193 but the logic 
had been repudiated much earlier. Felix Cohen explained the circularity that 
this approach rests upon: “The vicious circle inherent in this reasoning is 
plain. It purports to base legal protection upon economic value, when, as a 
matter of actual fact, the economic value of a sales device depends upon the 
extent to which it will be legally protected.”194
In short, what is tolerated today may become commodified tomorrow. 
Currently, book-themed camps offered by the Girl Scouts, for example, feed 
a new generation’s love of reading and learning, and provide spaces for de-
veloping agency, empathy, and creativity without charging for these oppor-
tunities. But the question is if in the future, Warner Bros. will. The result 
may be a fait accompli, despite Warner Bros.’ currently thoughtful and bal-
anced approach to fans and fan activity. After some embarrassing early mis-
steps, Warner Bros. stopped sending cease-and-desist letters to fans, and 
recognizes that fan activity bolsters the long-term value of their brand. In 
most cases, Dale Nelson, Vice President and Intellectual Property Counsel, 
says Warner Bros. tolerates fan uses of their brand properties.195 At the same 
time, however, she says they are ready to act if a fan is “running a business 
based on our properties,” or in situations where Warner Bros. believes it is 
protecting its derivative markets “or potential markets.”196 “We may not be
in that market today,” Nelson says, “but we may be” in the future.197 Warner 
Bros. will not go after nonprofit groups like the Girl Scouts who host Potter-
themed camps unless they see dollar signs in selling the experiences the Girl 
Scouts have long given kids for free. The Warner Bros. legal team has already 
considered commercializing the real world Quidditch leagues, although for 
now they have declined to do so.198
In 2017, the hottest bar in Chicago was a “pop-up” bar called The Up-
side Down, with art, furniture, and drinks that paid homage to the popular 
Netflix show Stranger Things.199 But when they considered extending its six-
week run, Netflix sent its owners a cease-and-desist letter. Likely aware of 
the Streisand Effect (where the effort to stamp out something unwittingly 
193. Dreyfuss, supra note 43, at 405.
194. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum.
L. Rev. 809, 815 (1935), cited in Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, supra note 43, at 
131 n.7.




199. Mina Bloom, Netflix Ends Unauthorized ‘Stranger Things’ Bar with a Super Classy 
Letter, DNAinfo (Sept. 18, 2017, 5:05 AM), https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20170918/
logan-square/netflix-stops-blocks-stranger-things-bar-pop-up-cease-and-desist-end-date (on 
file with the Michigan Law Review); Jeff John Roberts, Netflix Cease-and-Desist to ‘Stranger 
Things’ Bar Is an Internet Hit, Fortune (Sept. 20, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/20/
stranger-things-bar/ [https://perma.cc/82GU-KLRK].
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itself draws more publicity to that thing), Netflix’s lawyers drafted a funny 
letter, imagining the show’s monster brought to life to enforce their demand: 
I heard you launched a Stranger Things pop-up bar . . . . Look, I don’t want 
you to think I’m a total wastoid, and I love how much you guys love the 
show . . . . But unless I’m living in the Upside Down, I don’t think we did a 
deal with you for this pop-up. . . . . We love our fans more than anything, 
but you should know the Demogorgon is not always as forgiving.200 
The bar owners relented. 
Twentieth Century Fox was far less cool. A decade ago, fans of a short-
lived but beloved television series by Joss Whedon called Firefly began iden-
tifying themselves to one another by making, sharing, and wearing a tri-
colored knit cap, which had been worn by a character named Jayne in one 
episode.201 Fans of the show knit, sell, and buy these hats on popular websites 
such as Etsy, which sells all things handmade and DIY.202 That is, until 
Twentieth Century Fox, which owns IP rights in Firefly, told sellers to cease 
and desist selling their handmade Jayne hats after Fox signed its own exclu-
sive licensing deal for the hats.203 Fox’s claim was especially galling because 
Fox had no love for this show—it cancelled the show before even finishing 
one season.204 It was fans who gave value to the hats and created their iconic 
status. Yet this did not stop Fox from claiming an exclusive right to mer-
chandise the hats.205 
When Mark Towle began building and selling full-size, working replicas 
of the Batmobile for $90,000 so that individuals could play the part of Bat-
man in real life, DC Comics sued.206 DC Comics claimed both copyright and 
trademark infringement.207 The district court noted that the Batmobile itself 
served as a “superhero” and as “Batman’s sidekick.”208 The Ninth Circuit 
agreed that the Batmobile was a copyrighted character, and that Towle had 
infringed DC Comics’ copyright and trademark rights.209 Judge Sandra Iku-
 200. Letter from Bryce Coughlin, Director and Senior Counsel, Netflix, to Emporium 
Arcade Bar, care of Danny and Doug Marks (Aug. 23, 2017) (making multiple references to 
elements and characters of the Stranger Things series), quoted in Bloom, supra note 199 (calling 
the letter “adorably nerdy—yet firm”). 
 201. Yamshon, supra note 16. 
 202. See Firefly Jayne Hat, Etsy, https://www.etsy.com/search?q=Firefly%20Jayne%20hat 
[https://perma.cc/B5B2-XPLJ]. 
 203. Yamshon, supra note 16. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See also Amid Amidi, Cartoon Network Has Figured Out How to Make Money from 
Fan Art: The Cartoon Network Collective, Cartoon Brew (June 23, 2016, 2:33 PM), https://
www.cartoonbrew.com/fan-art-2/cartoon-network-figured-make-money-fan-art-cartoon-
network-collective-140910.html [https://perma.cc/QTJ5-NWEZ]. 
 206. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 1018. 
 209. Id. at 1027. 
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ta’s opinion demonstrated the spillover of the Batman story into our lives: 
the first paragraph, borrowing the language of Batman’s sidekick Robin, 
concludes, “Holy copyright law, Batman!”;210 when the opinion turns to the 
car, it exclaims, “To the Batmobile!”211 The opinion concludes with a quote 
from Batman: “In our well-ordered society, protection of private property is 
essential.”212 
When Alec Peters turned to crowdfunding for his Star Trek–based film, 
raising a million dollars, CBS and Paramount studios sued.213 Plaintiffs 
charged that unauthorized use of protected characters, species (including 
Vulcans and Klingons), settings, planets (Vulcan, Axanar, and Qo’noS), “the 
Vulcan council, the teachings of Vulcan philosopher Surak, the use of the 
Federation logo . . . and the Klingon language”214 violated copyright in the 
“mood” and “look and feel” of Star Trek.215 The district court rejected Peters’ 
fair use defense, saying the fan work was not a parody.216  
The scope of fair use is at issue in yet another scenario. Amazon now of-
fers fan writers the Kindle Worlds program, in which Amazon partners with 
content providers to license fans the right to write about their favorite fic-
tional worlds, in exchange for royalties if those stories sell.217 This move gives 
writers clarity about their rights, including the ability to make money from 
their writing. But the program may also lead to rights accretion;218 the fact 
that fans seek licenses to write fan fiction may later suggest that such licenses 
are required. 
Game of Thrones is the world’s most popular show, and “the most ob-
sessed-about” show as well.219 User-generated videos about the show have 
received some 1.4 billion views, dwarfing the 172 million views received by 
HBO’s own Game of Thrones channel.220 Even though many intellectual 
property holders recognize the “valuable promotion” offered by obsessed 
 210. Id. at 1015. 
 211. Id. at 1018. 
 212. Id. at 1027 (citation omitted). 
 213. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Axanar Prods., Inc., 121 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1699 (C.D. 
Cal. 2017). 
 214. Id. at 1704. 
 215. Id. at 1704, 1706–07. 
 216. Id. at 1706–09. 
 217. See Kindle Worlds, supra note 15. 
 218. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
Yale L.J. 882 (2007). 
 219. Daniel D’Addario, Game of Thrones: How They Make the World’s Most Popular 
Show, Time, http://time.com/game-of-thrones-2017/ [https://perma.cc/AAN5-Y8P7]. 
 220. Todd Spangler, How ‘Game of Thrones’ YouTube Fan Videos Help HBO’s Top Fran-
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fans,221 many Game of Thrones video creators still have their videos removed 
due to copyright claims.222 The videos seem to be removed by YouTube’s au-
tomated Content ID system, which may identify clips from the HBO show in 
fan videos and then act as if they are copyright infringing, without a fair use 
analysis.223
III. Theorizing Experience
John Dewey’s influential account of “art as experience” elaborates the 
synergistic relationship between works of art and the live human experience 
of art.224 Kenneth Arrow’s economic theory of “learning by doing”225 and 
theories of the nature of “tacit knowledge” teach that knowledge must be ex-
perienced through haptic and social engagement.226 Performance theory de-
scribes how human beings exercise creativity and agency by remediating the 
social and cultural works that seek to define them, and our age. This Part 
considers the relevance of these theories to the phenomena of deep cultural 
play with the stories and worlds that seek to define us and our time.227 What 
are the benefits of working through culture in the tactile and social ways af-
forded by cultural tangibles, from playing with foam swords, lightsabers, and 
wands in summer camps to elaborate cosplay by adults witnessed at events 
like the Star Trek convention and the Comic-Con held annually in San Die-
go? This Part explores the participatory, experiential, tactile, and physical 
side of cultural knowledge. Like scientific knowledge, cultural knowledge 
must be actively experienced, repeated, held, touched, experimented with, 
and practiced. Deeply engaged play in the fields of culture has both descrip-
tive and prescriptive purchase. Working through culture depicts how we en-
gage culture and develop knowledge. But working through culture goes fur-
ther still: putting ourselves in the shoes of another is a vehicle for learning 
from and connecting with others, developing critical thinking and creativity, 
experiencing joy, and fostering our humanity.
A. Art as Experience
John Dewey’s influential masterwork on aesthetics, Art as Experience,
argues against the idea of “art for art’s sake.”228 Art, he argues, can only be 
understood in the context of live human experience. Dewey eloquently ar-
gues against romanticizing art as walled off, separated from everyday prac-
221. Id.
222. Mills, supra note 17.
223. Id.
224. See Dewey, supra note 44.
225. See Arrow, Learning by Doing, supra note 45, at 156.
226. See infra Section III.C.
227. See Margaret Chon, Sticky Knowledge and Copyright, 2011 Wis. L. Rev. 177, 179–80.
228. Dewey, supra note 44, at 8.
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tices. The “primary task” of aesthetic theory, Dewey urged, is “to restore con-
tinuity between the refined and intensified forms of experience that are 
works of art and the everyday events, doings, and sufferings that are univer-
sally recognized to constitute experience.”229 A human is not to remain “a
cold spectator” of art, but should be swept up “by the pleasurable activity of 
the journey itself.”230 Dewey’s overarching project is “recovering the continu-
ity of esthetic experience with normal processes of living.”231 Failure to do so, 
he warns, “deeply affects the practice of living, driving away [a]esthetic per-
ceptions that are necessary ingredients of happiness.”232
Dewey’s project is threefold. First, he elaborates that art lies not in static 
art objects, but in human experience of works of art through everyday activi-
ty, including doing, making, and performing.233 Indeed, he defines art itself 
as aesthetic only to the extent it can produce “an experience in which the 
whole creature is alive and in which he possesses his living through enjoy-
ment.”234 Nothing less than humanity is at stake in Dewey’s exercise. Aes-
thetic experience, he argues, is what gives a human life meaning. The very 
purpose of art is to enable the live person to engage her world critically with 
all her senses, with the ultimate goal of self-actualization, joy, and fulfill-
ment. Indeed, this is the very meaning of “experience” for Dewey: “we have 
an experience when the material experienced runs its course to fulfill-
ment.”235
Second, Dewey is responding to the romantic ideal of art as created out 
of thin air, completely apart from and outside of one’s culture and context.236
Far from it, Dewey describes objects of art—for example, the Parthenon237—
as simultaneously arising from the civic ideals and mores of the day, and in 
turn informing and inspiring people in a certain time and place through the 
embodiment of those ideals. For Dewey, the focus should not be on the art 
object, but its interplay with the daily lives of a people through practice. Art 
229. Id. at 3; see id. at 3–19 (elaborating the experience of art by “the live creature”); id. at 
10 (arguing against “theories which isolate art and its appreciation by placing them in a realm 
of their own, disconnected from other modes of experiencing”).
230. Id. at 5.
231. Id. at 10.
232. Id.; see id. at 11 (“[T]he work of art develops and accentuates what is characteristi-
cally valuable in things of everyday enjoyment.”).
233. Id. at 47 (“Art denotes a process or doing or making.”).
234. Id. at 27.
235. Id. at 35; see also id. at 18 (“In life that is truly a life, everything overlaps and merg-
es.”).
236. Id. at 13 (“[L]ife goes on in an environment; not merely in it but because of it, 
through interaction with it. No creature lives merely under its skin.”); id. at 257 (“As to the 
poetical character itself . . . it is not itself—it has no self. It is everything and nothing. . . . he has 
no identity—he is continually in and for, and filling some other body. . . .” (quoting Letter from 
John Keats to Richard Woodhouse (Oct. 27, 1818)).
237. Id. at 4.
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is the progeny of “intercourse with our surroundings.”238 Interaction with 
the art objects of our time is a necessary prerequisite for understanding both 
art and self.239
Dewey’s aim is to reveal—and preserve—the continuum between the art 
object and people’s daily experience of it through practices of doing, playing, 
and experimenting, in order to foster human development and fulfillment.240
His lament is when “a wall is built around [art objects] that renders almost 
opaque their general significance”241 in the life of individuals and communi-
ties.242 Dewey emphasizes that the overriding value of the aesthetic is found 
not in objects but in practice, in human action and interaction, and in per-
ceiving art through action. 
At the same time, Dewey is writing in the early twentieth-century con-
text of industrialization and mass production of art and leisure, with its at-
tendant move away from handiwork and do-it-yourself, participatory cul-
ture, toward the mummification of art as museum pieces or canned 
commodities for people to receive passively. Dewey hopes to return to an age 
of participation243 and craftsmanship that involves the whole body, all hu-
man senses, and love.244
Today, the rise of participatory culture enabled by the internet and Web 
2.0 technologies, democratization of communicative and distribution pro-
cesses, and the rise of identity politics,245 makes more possible than ever 
Dewey’s vision of human flourishing through a democratic culture that facil-
itates critical engagement with cultural works to promote self-realization, 
238. Id. at 53.
239. “Individuality,” Dewey explains, “is realized only in interaction with surrounding 
conditions. In this process of intercourse, native capacities . . . are transformed and become a 
self.” Id. at 281–82.
240. See Beebe, supra note 44, at 345 (“It is found not in inert ‘art products,’ which ‘exist 
externally and physically . . . apart from human experience,’ but in the dynamic experience of 
perceiving and creating aesthetic phenomena.” (alteration in original) (first quoting Dewey,
supra note 44, at 218; then quoting id. at 3)); see also id. (“Pragmatist aesthetics asserts that the 
overriding value of the aesthetic is found not in objects but in practice, in human action and 
interaction.”).
241. Dewey, supra note 44, at 3; see also id. at 12 (“[A] philosophy of art is sterilized un-
less it makes us aware of the function of art in relation to other modes of experience.”).
242. Id. at 7 (recalling a time when “drama, music, painting, and architecture . . . were
part of the significant life of an organized community”).
243. “Experience is . . . that interaction of organism and environment which, when it is 
carried to the full, is a transformation of interaction into participation and communication.” Id.
at 22 (emphasis added).
244. Dewey writes that doing and making rises to the level of craftsmanship when it is 
done with “loving.” Id. at 47–48; see also id. at 5 (“The intelligent mechanic engaged in his job, 
interested in doing well and finding satisfaction in his handiwork, caring for his materials and
tools with genuine affection, is artistically engaged.”).
245. See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 257 (2006) (describing the potentialities 
arising from the early 21st century convergence of the Internet Protocol, intellectual property, 
and identity politics).
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critical thinking, joy, and understanding of others.246 Increasingly today in-
dividuals demand and have the tools to “rip, mix, and burn” culture, assert-
ing themselves as active producers, rather than passive consumers, of cul-
ture.247 In the final Part I turn to how the law of merchandising rights may 
better promote Dewey’s vision of human flourishing, which is premised on 
the ability of human beings to freely interact with culture through everyday 
practices.
B. Learning by Doing
In 1962 Kenneth Arrow observed: “Learning is the product of experi-
ence. Learning can only take place through the attempt to solve a problem 
and therefore only takes place during activity.”248 Arrow famously argued 
that, contrary to expectations, repetitive activity hones understanding, facili-
tates learning, spurs innovation, and ultimately leads to “steadily increasing 
performance.”249
Repetition and copying to attain mastery are often key components to 
the processes of learning, creativity, and innovation.250 Artists have long set 
up their easels in museums seeking to develop their own skills by copying 
the masters.251 Even the living members of the Beatles, a group notorious for 
never having licensed their work, have looked more favorably upon interac-
tive technologies that allow individuals to learn, play, and take apart their 
songs with this goal in mind. The Beatles: Rock Band video game allows users 
to “come together” with John, Paul, George, and Ringo, jamming and creat-
246. See Sunder, From Goods to a Good Life, supra note 48, at 67–68 (discussing 
Dewey on the connection between art as experience and autonomy and self-development); id.
at 74–75 (discussing Dewey on the connection between art as experience and mutual under-
standing).
247. See Sunder, supra note 245, at 277.
248. Arrow, Learning by Doing, supra note 45, at 155.
249. Id. at 155–56. For more recent observations of the role of “learning by doing” in 
providing firms a competitive advantage outside of patent protection, see, for example, Jona-
than M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1251, 1263 (2004) 
(“On the production side, a first-mover may, as a result of either ‘learning-by-doing’ and/or 
economies of scale, enjoy cost efficiencies that enable it to offer prices below imitators and pre-
serve its market share.”).
250. See Jen Graves, No, Not Here, That’s Not Possible: Why Can’t Artists Be Artists at 
SAM and the Frye?, Stranger (Aug. 21, 2008), https://www.thestranger.com/seattle/no-not-
here-thats-not-possible/Content?oid=649502 [https://perma.cc/VWG5-NEGF] (reviewing In-
spiring Impressionism show at the Seattle Art Museum (SAM) on impressionists’ copies of 
master works, and noting with irony that SAM does not let modern artists do the same in its 
own halls).
251. See id.
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ing songs.252 Learning is a key goal of the game.253 McCartney himself admits 
to emulating “Buddy Holly, Little Richard, Jerry Lee Lewis [and] Elvis.”254
Tomorrow’s musicians will learn by miming The Beatles and other rock 
bands.
Learning by doing has a social dimension. Arrow describes the role 
played by personal contacts in the transmission of knowledge, as familiarity 
and trust facilitate knowledge disclosure and acceptance.255 Individuals share 
knowledge through mentoring and apprenticeships with people they know 
and trust. Personal relationships can override efficiency in knowledge mar-
kets.256 As Arrow concludes, “The production of knowledge is thus basically 
different in character from the production of goods.”257
Learning has been a core purpose of copyright since its inception. The 
very first copyright law, the Statute of Anne enacted in England in 1710, was 
described as “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning,” and the first U.S. 
Copyright Act of 1790 bore the same subtitle and aspiration. 
In the fields of education and human development, nearly a century of 
clinical studies and theory have elaborated how children learn by actively 
working through the cultural discourses that surround them through “pre-
tend play.”258 Studies document that role-playing is a normatively beneficial 
way of learning. Elaborating on the world around us, children mime to learn 
social roles, yet they also take creative liberties that test expectations. Culture 
for children is a sphere not only of entertainment and enjoyment, or assimi-
lation, but also of experimentation and innovation. Recent studies show oth-
252. Seth Schiesel, All Together Now: Play the Game, Mom, N.Y. Times (Sept. 1, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/arts/television/06schi.html (on file with the Michigan 
Law Review).
253. On this point, see generally Cornelia Homburg, The Copy Turns Original: Vin-
cent van Gogh and a New Approach to Traditional Art Practice (1996). I discuss this 
example in Sunder, From Goods to a Good Life, supra note 48. Scholars such as Eric von 
Hippel and William Fisher have shown that practicing and using patented products can yield 
innovation by users who modify goods to better suit their work, art, or sport. See Eric von
Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (2005); William W. Fisher III, The Implications for Law 
of User Innovation, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1417 (2010).
254. Daniel Radosh, While My Guitar Gently Beeps, N.Y. Times Mag. (Aug. 11, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/magazine/16beatles-t.html (on file with the Michigan 
Law Review).
255. Kenneth J. Arrow, Classificatory Notes on the Production and Transmission of Tech-
nological Knowledge, Am. Econ. Rev., May 1969, at 29, 34 [hereinafter Arrow, Classificatory 
Notes].
256. See Barnett, supra note 249, at 1263–64 (arguing that first movers are advantaged by 
learning by doing and social relations they develop with resellers and retailers, which form a 
natural barrier to competitors, at least for some period of time).
257. Arrow, Classificatory Notes, supra note 255, at 30.
258. See, e.g., Astrida Seja Kaugars & Sandra W. Russ, Assessing Preschool Children’s Pre-
tend Play: Preliminary Validation of the Affect in Play Scale-Preschool Version, 20 Early Educ.
& Dev. 733, 734 (2009) (“[P]retend play is considered integral to preschool children’s devel-
opment since it represents an intersection of cognitive processes, affective processes, and in-
terpersonal processes.”).
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er benefits of role-playing include helping children negotiate conflict, devel-
op self-control, and foster language ability and collaborative skills.259
Perhaps most importantly in our diverse and increasingly interconnect-
ed world, physically and emotionally inhabiting the role of the other helps to 
foster empathy, enabling children to contemplate what it may be like to walk 
in another’s shoes.260 Play-based learning is not limited to children. A 
worldwide phenomenon for adults called cosplay, short for “costume play,”
has spread from Japan to other parts of the globe celebrating these same 
principles.261 Individuals develop and wear elaborate costumes mimicking 
their favorite anime or manga characters; gender-switching called “cross-
play” is common, as a vehicle for gaining greater understanding of the other 
and of challenging traditional gender roles.262
Theories of learning by doing are gaining new purchase in the context of 
online games, the internet, and what Henry Jenkins has called “participatory 
culture.”263 Watchwords in the new digital learning landscape are role-
playing, performance, embodiment, and appropriation.264 As the authors of a 
critically acclaimed new book about digital learning write, “The twenty-first 
century . . . belongs to the tacit. In the digital world, we learn by doing, 
watching, and experiencing.”265 The new literacy skills in the digital age in-
clude: 
Play — the capacity to experiment with one’s surroundings as a form of 
problem-solving 
259. See id. at 738–39 (“Children who engage in social fantasy play have more often have 
[sic] been found to be more socially competent . . . .”); id. at 751 (“Children who expressed 
more affect in their play and who played with ease demonstrated desirable levels of socioemo-
tional adjustment and low levels of behavior problems.”).
260. See id. at 739 (“[B]oys and girls who engaged in high levels of pretend play per-
formed better on a task assessing understanding of emotions.”).
261. See Melia Robinson, An Introduction into the Wild World of Cosplay, Bus. Insider
(Oct. 9, 2015, 1:09 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-cosplay-2014-10 [https://
perma.cc/ZT7N-28D2].
262. See generally Rachel Leng, Gender, Sexuality, and Cosplay: A Case Study of Male-to-
Female Crossplay, Phx. Papers, Apr. 2013, at 89, http://fansconf.a-kon.com/dRuZ33A/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Gender-Sexuality-and-Cosplay-by-Rachel-Leng1.pdf [https://perma.
cc/ST4V-K2UQ].
263. See generally Henry Jenkins et al., Confronting the Challenges of Participa-
tory Culture: Media Education for the 21st Century (2009).
264. Michael Young et al., MMOGs as Learning Environments: An Ecological Journey into 
Quest Atlantis and The Sims Online, Innovate, April/May 2006, art. 2, https://
nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1135&context=innovate (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review) (elaborating “[c]ontemporary theories of learning as embodied and 
embedded in action”).
265. Douglas Thomas & John Seely Brown, A New Culture of Learning: Culti-
vating the Imagination for a World of Constant Change 76 (2011); see also Kurt
Squire, Video Games and Learning: Teaching and Participatory Culture in the Digi-
tal Age (2011).
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Performance — the ability to adopt alternative identities for the purpose of 
improvisation and discovery 
Simulation — the ability to interpret and construct dynamic models of real-
world processes 
Appropriation — the ability to meaningfully sample and remix media con-
tent . . . .266
The new literacy understands play267 and performance268 as essential 
learning practices for developing critical thinking, collaboration, creativity, 
and social skills. Fan activities, such as editing and writing a fictional, Harry 
Potter–inspired newspaper online, for example, teach professional skills, 
such as reading and writing and also how to collaborate and negotiate with 
young online participants around the world.269 Making elaborate costumes 
or other fan art develops imagination and marketable skills for tomorrow. It 
was by playing Harry Potter in an unauthorized Harry Potter musical at the 
University of Michigan that Glee star Darren Criss first began developing his 
own following, which eventually led him to a lead role on the hit television 
show Glee.270 In short, working through and deeply playing in the cultural 
worlds we love help us to develop both marketable talents and skills required 
in a democracy. Through role-playing we learn to problem solve with others 
and to develop understanding of others unlike ourselves. Yesterday we were 
bowling together to form social solidarity and foster citizenship.271 Today we 
are playing Quidditch and engaging diverse others in imaginative, immersive 
play, online272 and in the real world.273
266. Jenkins et al., supra note 263, at 4.
267. Id. at 23 (“[T]here is a growing recognition that play itself, as a means of exploring 
and processing knowledge and of problem-solving, may be a valuable skill children should 
master in preparation for subsequent roles and responsibilities in the adult world.”).
268. Id. at 31 (“Performance brings with it capacities to understand problems from mul-
tiple viewpoints, to assimilate information, to exert mastery over core cultural materials, and to 
improvise in response to a changing environment.”).
269. Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide
171–79 (2006) (sharing example of 14-year-old Heather Lawver, who edited a real world, 
online Daily Prophet newspaper, inspired by the Harry Potter world, with other kids around 
the world).
270. Rae Votta, Inside Darren Criss’ Team StarKid: From ‘A Very Potter Musical’ to 
SPACE Tour, Billboard (Nov. 28, 2011), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/464956/
inside-darren-criss-team-starkid-from-a-very-potter-musical-to-space-tour [https://perma.cc/
3XUG-YUU5]. (The Michigan Law Review’s own Executive Online Editor Joe Moses played 
Snape in ‘A Very Potter Musical’!)
271. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of Ameri-
can Community (2000).
272. Young et al., supra note 264 at 1 (“Success in a MMOG requires developing new lit-
eracies, understanding intricate and intersecting rule sets, thinking creatively within con-
straints, collaborating with other participants towards shared goals, and perhaps most im-
portantly, taking on new identities as players (via their avatars) inhabit game spaces.”).
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C. Tacit Knowledge
Theories of tacit knowledge elaborate the social dimension of 
knowledge. Michael Polanyi famously defined tacit knowledge as implicated 
by the reality that “we can know more than we can tell.”274 Others employ the 
term “sticky knowledge” to explain the same concept. As Margaret Chon de-
scribes, “Knowledge is sticky because it adheres to people along social 
routes . . . .”275 Thus far scholars have studied the implications of tacit or 
sticky knowledge for patent and trade secret law, describing how knowledge 
is understood and developed not by the mere patent disclosure, but through 
human interactions such as scholarly exchanges, visits to laboratories, and 
mentor/mentee relationships.276 Recently, Chon explored the potential rele-
vance of the concept to copyright law.277 This Article also considers the in-
sights of tacit knowledge in the context of copyright and trademark laws. 
Copyright’s goal is the promotion of knowledge. But tacit knowledge 
theory suggests that copyrighted products—books, films, music—are only 
goods. Knowledge lies between the lines. Chon is concerned that copyright 
law does not pay enough heed to tacit knowledge, the knowledge developed 
in the activities, conversations, and social relationships conducted around 
and through copyrighted works.278
Mutual understanding and knowledge exchange emerges through social 
interactions that foster experience and trust. In the context of scientific re-
search, for example, star researchers may hold tacit knowledge that others 
will only come to know through apprenticing or collaborating with the indi-
vidual and developing trust and mutual respect. Relationships are crucial to 
the transfer of tacit knowledge: apprentice and master, student and teacher, 
colleague and colleague, friend and friend. Cultural products, too, must be 
socially engaged in order to be more fully known. As Chon reminds us, “stu-
dents still fill classrooms and implicitly demand by their presence that teach-
273. For an important critique of digital culture’s effects on sociability, see Sherry
Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each
Other (2011).
274. Polanyi, supra note 46, at 4.
275. Chon, supra note 227, at 177.
276. See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1009 (2008); Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, 
and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 1503, 1536–37 
(2012) (arguing that the success of Silicon Valley is its geography—being near Stanford allows 
for fruitful collaborations between the academy and industry); Katherine J. Strandburg, Norms 
and the Sharing of Research Materials and Tacit Knowledge, in Working Within the Bound-
aries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 85 (Ro-
chelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2010).
277. See Chon, supra note 227, at 177 (“This Article delves into sticky knowledge, which 
has been referenced . . . within the laws of patents and trade secrets but almost not at all within 
copyright law.”).
278. Id. at 211–16.
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ers explain the contents of their textbooks . . . . And visitors to art museums 
often feel that they do not comprehend a great piece of art unless it is viewed 
within the context of an experienced critic’s or docent’s guidance.”279 Read-
ing literature together in social groups such as book clubs or in diverse class-
room settings promotes understanding of the work and of one another.
Knowledge transfer requires a process Polanyi referred to as indwelling, 
defined as the practice of putting oneself in the mindset of another. 
“[I]ndwelling, or empathy,” Polanyi wrote, “is the proper means of knowing 
man and the humanities.”280 “[I]t is not by looking at things, but by dwelling 
in them, that we understand their . . . meaning.”281 Repetition of a master’s
moves, for example, teaches a pupil not only crucial skills but the master’s
mindset. By dwelling in the master’s moves, “the pupil gets the feel of a mas-
ter’s skill and may learn to rival him.”282 Polanyi describes physical insertion 
into worlds as a critical means by which individuals develop knowledge and 
social skills. Lin-Manuel Miranda’s runaway Broadway hit, Hamilton, exem-
plifies indwelling, as black and Latino actors embody the roles of the Ameri-
can Founding Fathers, forever changing how we understand our shared his-
tory.283
We may usefully reconsider some current legal doctrines as facilitating 
transfer of sticky knowledge. For example, cover licenses in copyright law 
allow bands to play music, thereby facilitating their learning and under-
standing of it. Similarly, fair use for educational purposes, book reviews, ref-
erence guides, and academic literature helps to more fully understand a work 
and promotes learning.
We should be careful to avoid characterizing tacit knowledge as a prob-
lem to be resolved, for example through more perfect disclosure in patent 
law. Sticky knowledge promotes our humanity because it requires engaging 
with others for learning and mutual understanding. Recalling Arrow, this 
social dimension is precisely what distinguishes knowledge from other 
goods.284 Processes of active and social engagement with cultural knowledge 
foster mutual understanding and humanity. As Polanyi long ago warned, if 
we “suppose that tacit thought forms an indispensable part of all knowledge, 
then the ideal of eliminating all personal elements of knowledge would, in 
effect, aim at the destruction of all knowledge.”285 “[T]he process of formaliz-
279. Id. at 179; see also id. at 188 (“Moviegoers, opera lovers, and dance aficionados . . .
[all] feel the need to discuss the impact and meaning of what they have just experienced . . . .”).
280. Polanyi, supra note 46, at 16.
281. Id. at 18.
282. Id. at 30 (offering the example of the chess player who would “enter into a master’s 
spirit by rehearsing the games he played, to discover what he had in mind”).
283. Ben Brantley, Review: ‘Hamilton,’ Young Rebels Changing History and Theater, N.Y.
Times (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/07/theater/review-hamilton-young-
rebels-changing-history-and-theater.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
284. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
285. Polanyi, supra note 46, at 20.
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ing all knowledge to the exclusion of any tacit knowing is self-defeating.”286
In a foreword to a 2009 republication of Polanyi’s work, Amartya Sen writes 
that “[t]his has subversive implications for the general approach of formali-
zation since it looks for ‘the kind of lucidity which destroys its subject mat-
ter.’ ”287 As Sen and Polanyi urge, striving for perfect disclosure is unwise, as 
that would make us less human.
D. Performance
By using the term “performance,” theorists do not refer to “a means by 
which a text is represented, [or] ‘licensed,’ ” but rather refer to performance 
“as an experience (or set of experiences) of sociability.”288
In 1993, performance theorist Peggy Phelan put forth the provocative 
idea that performance by its nature cannot be reproduced or commodi-
fied.289 In a foundational essay, Phelan writes, “Performance’s only life is in 
the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or other-
wise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once 
it does so, it becomes something other than performance.”290
To what extent does the Copyright Act implicitly agree with this idea by 
giving less protection to performance qua performance? Phelan describes 
performance as uncommodifiable, and potentially understood as “valueless”
because it escapes the reproductive economy.291 Or is it the ability of perfor-
mance to resist commodification that makes it priceless? At the same time, 
Phelan acknowledges that the
[P]ressures brought to bear on performance to succumb to the laws of the 
reproductive economy are enormous. For only rarely in this culture is the 
“now” to which performance addresses its deepest questions valued. (This 
is why the now is supplemented and buttressed by the documenting cam-
era, the video archive.)292
286. Id.
287. Amartya Sen, Foreword to Polanyi, supra note 46, at xi.
288. Simon Frith, Performing Rites: On the Value of Popular Music 204 (1996).
289. Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance 148 (1993) (“Perfor-
mance in a strict ontological sense is nonreproductive.”).
290. Id. at 146.
291. Id. at 148 (“[P]erformance art is vulnerable to charges of valuelessness and empti-
ness.”). As Phelan explains, because live performance that is not recorded “disappears into 
memory,” it enters a “realm of invisibility” where it “eludes regulation and control. Perfor-
mance resists the balanced circulations of finance.” Id. For Phelan, “[p]erformance’s independ-
ence from mass reproduction, technologically, economically, and linguistically, is its greatest 
strength.” Id. at 149.
292. Id. at 146.
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Phelan’s description raises the question whether performance is the kind of 
activity the Copyright Act intends to regulate. Is self-insertion really repro-
duction?293 Human performance is not mechanical reproduction.  
At the same time, we must be cautious not to essentialize “live” perfor-
mance as something unique and more authentic than mediatized perfor-
mance. In an important critique of Phelan, Philip Auslander observes that 
even “live” performance is mediated by technology. Auslander notes that 
“live” performances from rock concerts to operas today are made for televi-
sion and rock concerts seek to recreate the record.294 “Remediation” refers to 
“the representation of one medium in another.”295 Remediation paradoxical-
ly shows us that media does not just represent reality; for example, modern 
art may not represent reality at all. Rather, the process of remediation—of 
modern art’s continual reference to itself—illustrates that media is itself real; 
the act of remediation reveals media as an artifact of our world.296 Conclud-
ing that all performance is remediated or mediatized—that is, recasting con-
tent from one context to another—Auslander rejects “the argument for on-
tological differences between live and mediatized cultural forms.”297  
This is an important point. I do not argue that the children’s play should 
be specially permitted because it is pure and unadulterated, while mediatized 
performances—from television to films to YouTube—are not. To the contra-
ry, as performance theorists like Auslander observe, all performance is a re-
mediation of earlier performance. At Camp Half-Blood, children recast print 
media and film.298 The interactive web portal Harry Potter: Hogwarts Mys-
tery299 remediates literature and film, allowing participants to be both actor 
and director.300 
What is perhaps most important about remediation is that performance 
and embodied engagement with the social and cultural worlds that form us 
are critical tools for the assertion of individual agency back upon those 
worlds; performance is the vehicle for developing one’s own place and voice 
in the story. This is the sense in which the social theorist Bruno Latour de-
 293. See Celia Lury
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scribes human beings as “hybrids” of the techno-cultural worlds in which we 
live.301 Individuals are formed by our media while simultaneously developing 
our agency through that same media. 
Carrie Noland’s work on agency and embodiment sheds light on the 
value of kids and adults remediating shared cultural experiences in new con-
texts.302 Noland studies “the ways culture is both embodied and challenged 
through corporeal performance.”303 Writes Noland, “If bodily motility is . . .
the single most important filtering device in the subject’s negotiations with 
the external world, then a theory of agency that places movement center 
stage is essential to understanding how human beings are embodied with-
in—and impress themselves on—their worlds.”304
Noland defines embodiment as “the process whereby collective behav-
iors and beliefs, acquired through acculturation, are rendered individual and 
‘lived’ at the level of the body.”305 While theorists after Foucault have worried 
about the ways cultural norms prescribe individual behavior, Noland offers a 
theory of embodiment and agency, where agency is defined as “the power to 
alter those acquired behaviors and beliefs for purposes that may be reactive 
(resistant) or collaborative (innovative) in kind.”306 The body is a means 
through which individuals engage the world. She calls gesture “the organized 
forms of kinesis through which subjects navigate and alter their worlds.”307
Noland argues that embodiment and gestures, though performing the cul-
ture around us, are not rote processes. Individuals exert their agency through 
bodily movement, elaborating their own place in the world. Noland rejects a 
binary approach to agency and embodiment that would only view embodi-
ment as an act of cultural resistance.308 Noland argues that “despite the very 
real force of social conditioning, human subjects continue to invent surpris-
ing new ways of altering the inscribed behaviors they are called on to per-
form.”309
Legal scholar Julie Cohen pioneered the introduction of theories of em-
bodiment and play to elaborate our understanding of copyright law.310 Co-
301. Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern 3 (Catherine Porter trans., Harv. 
Univ. Press 1993) (1991). The interdependent relationship between the self and technoculture 
is a central insight of Science and Technology Studies (STS). For a nice overview of STS and 
Latour, see Alain Pottage, The Materiality of What?, 39 J.L. & Soc’y 167 (2012).
302. See Noland, supra note 47.
303. Id. at 2.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 9.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 4.
308. Id. at 3.
309. Id. at 7–8.
310. Cohen, supra note 39, at 57 (arguing for play to “be a central consideration” for 
copyright law).
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hen writes that in the new networked world, the body continues to be an im-
portant site of self-creation and mediation311 and should not be forgotten.312
Similarly, she has elaborated the importance of play, not just for children, 
but for adults, as well.313 Cohen is particularly concerned with “play with ob-
jects and narratives, which locates the individual in relation to material and 
intellectual culture, and play with conceptions of empathy and morality, 
which enables individuals to form and pursue conceptions of the good.”314
E. Critiques
The critic will demur that my elaboration of the benefits of play posits 
cultural activity purely in an instrumental light. What about play for play’s
sake? Highlighting that learning, critical thinking, social skills, and mutual 
understanding emerge from play should not diminish play as an end in itself. 
Surely, creative and social play with others in communities of shared mean-
ing is not only a means for attaining greater freedom and mutual recogni-
tion. Cultural play is an end of freedom, part of what makes a human life 
worth living.
We must be wary of a cultural merchandising law that does not pay heed 
to the broader cultural and social dimensions of play and learning by doing. 
Current law is, in Tom Conley’s words, “commodifying the experience of 
experience.”315 Property scholars raised concerns about commodifying body 
parts and reproductive services.316 Where do we draw the line on commodi-
fying experiences that foster play, sociability, collaboration, innovation, 
learning, and sheer joy?
I do not argue that all uses promoting learning must remain uncom-
modified. I do not mean to suggest that a poor child without a $30 wand is 
deprived of the basic human right to imagine. Indeed, one could argue, per-
suasively, that not buying the wand would facilitate even more imaginative 
play. I do, however, caution that exclusive licensing rights ought only be 
311. See id. at 50–57 (describing “play’s twofold in-betweenness—in between reproduc-
tion and resistance”).
312. See id. at 38 (discussing bodies “as both vehicles for social shaping and tools for the 
rejection of social shaping and the assertion of critical knowledge”); id. (“[T]he body has been 
too long neglected (or rejected) in social thought . . . .”); id. at 40 (“[W]e cannot simply leave 
bodies and spaces behind as we enter the networked information age.”).
313. See id. at 53 (“Social scientists who study play have concluded that its developmental 
functions extend into adulthood and remain centrally implicated in the processes by which 
individuals orient themselves in relation to the world.”).
314. Id. at 53–54 (“[S]cholars from a number of disciplines have advanced a variety of 
theories about the social function of play—developing identity within the parameters estab-
lished by community roles and norms, cultivating social and workplace skills or entrepreneuri-
al instincts, constituting social narratives and mythologies, rehearsing social power.”).
315. Conley likens the practice to commodifying a child’s transitional blanket. Tom Con-
ley, Lowell Professor of Romance Languages and Visual and Envtl. Studies, Harvard Univ., 
Remarks at the Tangibles and Intangibles Conference at Harvard University (Apr. 1–2, 2011).
316. See Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities (1996).
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granted when justified on traditional legal grounds, such as likelihood of 
confusion (trademark) and substantial similarity (copyright). In the absence 
of these concerns, third parties should be free to create and enter markets 
that would seek to bring new innovations to more people through cheaper 
prices. Moreover, even in cases where there is some likelihood of confusion 
or similarity, we ought to still weigh the factors that would constitute in-
stances of fair use, which in copyright law include consideration of non-
commercial and transformative use, the amount used, the nature of the un-
derlying work, and the effect on the market for the original, as I discuss in 
Part IV.317
Another objection will be that children’s play need not require access to 
popular intellectual properties—indeed, that children’s play is corrupted by
obsession with commercial properties at the expense of their own creativity. 
Why can’t today’s children play wizards instead of Harry Potter?318 To this, 
let me offer three replies. First, there is no culture without shared meaning. 
In that sense, cultural play and collaboration will necessarily revolve around 
the stories and discourses that children share and encounter together in the 
world; these cultural works inform them and provide a shared language. 
Culture is the social glue and shared meaning through which they com-
municate. Another way of saying this is that while cultural fantasy worlds 
may be fictional, they comprise “real” artifacts in the world that thereby act 
on the world—or mediate—between individuals and society.319
Second, this is particularly so of profitable intellectual properties, which 
bombard our discourse. Children inevitably do imagine themselves in these 
worlds. Moreover, they should be able to exert their agency in these worlds 
because it is important to be able to speak back against the dominant cultural 
forces that shape our perceptions of ourselves and others. Consider, for ex-
ample, the popular Twitter meme #BlackHogwarts, reimagining the nearly 
all-white Harry Potter movies with black culture and cast.320
Third, as I have described elsewhere, critical engagement in the cultural 
sphere, not just outside of it, helps to promote central skills and values of 
democratic citizenship—caring, empathy, and critical thinking.321
In Part IV, I turn to consider how a Deweyan approach to art as experi-
ence, and contemporary theories of learning by doing, tacit knowledge, and 
performance, can inform us as we draw limits on the reach of trademark and 
copyright into imaginative play and activity.
317. See infra Section IV.B.
318. Thanks to Rebecca Tushnet for this query.
319. See Bolter & Grusin, supra note 295, at 58.
320. Mary Papenfuss, #BlackHogwarts Magically Takes Twitter by Storm, Huffington
Post (Jan. 11, 2018, 11:20 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/blackhogwarts-takes-
twitter_us_5a58041ce4b04df054f778db [https://perma.cc/C35C-ZP5B].
321. Sunder, From Goods to a Good Life, supra note 48, at 9.
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IV. Reforming Merchandising Rights in Experience
Intellectual property scholarship has too often neglected “the interplay 
of cultural works with people.”322 In an earlier paper, I asked, “what if we 
understood creative works as crucial to education, socialization, and even the 
creation of our own identities?”323 In this final Part, I seek to elaborate limits 
to merchandising rights in imaginary worlds informed by theories of art as 
experience, learning by doing, tacit knowledge, and performance.
Intellectual property law, from patent to copyright to trademark, is 
premised on balance between innovation and access, and doctrinally struc-
tured around the limits of these laws: from the high standards for patentabil-
ity to promote access to everyday scientific advances, to the numerous rules 
and exceptions to protect competition, speech, and cultural interchange in 
copyright and trademark law. The theory and doctrine of intellectual proper-
ty are premised on a skepticism of monopoly rights, particularly in spheres 
as critical to human development as science and the arts. 
In contrast, the law of merchandising rights increasingly appears bound-
less, promising to the owners of intellectual property in fantasy worlds the 
right to exploit all potential derivative markets in their worlds. This Article 
proposes limits on merchandising rights in imaginary worlds that affect core 
human practices. Recognizing limits on these rights would make the emer-
gent merchandising right consistent with other areas of intellectual property 
law. More importantly, limits guided by cultural and social theory would 
promote the ability to freely engage in activities central to our humanity. 
Notably, two of the most powerful limits to copyright and trademark 
protection—fair use and the First Amendment—thus far have not proved to 
be strong bulwarks against property rights in fan activity and experience. 
The central limitation on the application of the fair use doctrine to fan activi-
ty is that this doctrine has been narrowly understood as a tool for rectifying 
market failure, and no more. Under this narrow economic view, there is 
market failure when trademarks or copyrights are used for parody or cri-
tique—the idea is who would grant a license to be made fun of?324 In such 
cases, fair use rectifies market failure, allowing parody to get made notwith-
standing any license from the intellectual property owner.325
In contexts of fan fiction and fan activity, the economic theory holds 
there is no market failure because the fan work, far from critiquing the origi-
322. Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Copyright’s Cultural Turn, 91 Tex. L. Rev.
1397, 1405 (2013) (highlighting Julie Cohen’s Configuring the Networked Self as an exception to 
this rule).
323. Id.
324. See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure and the 
Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305, 305–07 (1993).
325. Cf. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(affirming the district court’s order enjoining the publication and distribution of The Cat NOT 
in the Hat!, an unlicensed satire of the O.J. Simpson trial featuring the character created by Dr. 
Seuss).
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nal, pays homage to the original fantasy world, seeking to deeply engage that 
world and extend it. The narrow economic approach would hold that in 
such cases there is no market failure, and thus no need for fair use. The op-
erating principle is get a license or cease and desist. 
The First Amendment is directly implicated in many cases of fan activi-
ty. But surprisingly, this amendment has not been used to directly regulate 
trademark or copyright law, with the notable exception of the recent deci-
sion of Matal v. Tam, in which the Supreme Court invalidated the federal 
trademark statute’s ban on registration of marks that disparage minority 
groups on First Amendment grounds.326 The conventional wisdom is that 
the First Amendment is built into the doctrines of trademark327 and copy-
right,328 including but not limited to fair use. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has recently rejected direct First Amendment challenges in two cases con-
testing extensions of the copyright term and their effects on the public do-
main.329  
In this Section, I propose analyses of trademark and copyright fair use 
driven by a Deweyan approach that recognizes the human need for experi-
ence of art. The approach I recommend stands in contrast to the current 
economic approach driven by concern for market failure alone. Where the 
market failure approach judges works of art as static objects, the Deweyan 
approach elucidates the continuum between the art object and the haptic ex-
perience of art, celebrating human beings’ interactive discussion and play 
with works of art. This approach recognizes that imaginative fan activities 
are distinct from other market activity, and must be regulated with recogni-
tion of their salutary benefits to self and society.  
 326. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
 327. First Amendment values are accommodated in numerous ways internally to trade-
mark doctrine, including prohibitions on trademarks in gross, the use in commerce require-
ment, the trademark use requirement, the distinctiveness requirement, prohibitions on pro-
tecting merely descriptive and generic marks, the law’s traditional focus on consumer 
confusion, and fair use. In addition, the trademark law has incorporated the “Rogers test,” ar-
ticulated in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), to balance First Amendment inter-
ests in defendants’ use of plaintiffs’ trademarks in titles for defendants’ expressive works. The 
Rogers test prohibits trademark protection unless the title “has no artistic relevance to the un-
derlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly mis-
leads as to the source or the content of the work.” Id. at 999. 
 328. Copyright provides First Amendment protections through, among other limits, the 
originality requirement, idea/expression dichotomy, merger doctrine, prohibition on copyright 
in facts, exceptions for standards, scene a fair, stock characters, and fair use. 
 329. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012) (holding that U.S. act restoring copyright sta-
tus to foreign works previously in the public domain does not violate the First Amendment); 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (holding that the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act 
adding 20 years to the copyright term does not violate the First Amendment).  
 
 
November 2018] Intellectual Property in Experience 247 
A. Trademark Fair Use 
There are two kinds of trademark fair use: classic fair use and nomina-
tive fair use. Classic fair use refers to statutory fair use provided for in section 
33(b) of the Lanham Act, allowing a defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark if it is 
“descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or 
services of” defendant.330 In the U.S. Supreme Court case of KP Permanent 
Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., the Court held that defendant’s 
use of the term “micro colors” to describe its own product, permanent 
makeup, was a good faith use to describe defendant’s own product, not to 
trade on the goodwill of plaintiff’s product.331 This type of fair use is rarely 
applicable in cases involving fan activity, which directly borrows recogniza-
ble and protected character names, places, and phrases from fantasy works. 
In fan activity cases, the defendants’ use of trademarked phrases is to refer to 
plaintiff’s works, not to defendant’s own products or services.  
Nominative fair use, on the other hand, is directly relevant to fan activi-
ty. Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit developed this 
judge-made fair use doctrine in the context of a fan activity case. In New 
Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., the Ninth Circuit faced 
the question whether the popular boy band of the early 1990s, New Kids on 
the Block, could prohibit newspapers from profiting off of the band’s popu-
larity.332 In that case, two national newspapers, USA Today and The Star, 
used for-profit, 900 area code phone numbers to poll their readers about 
their favorite members of the band.333 Fans could call the 900 area code 
phone numbers to answer questions such as “Who’s the best on the block?,” 
“[A]re they a turn off?,” and “[W]hich kid is the sexiest?”334 The newspapers 
used the polls to generate stories about the band and donated the proceeds to 
charity.335 Despite the free publicity, New Kids sued. As the court explained, 
New Kids feared the newspapers “were undermining their hegemony over 
their fans.”336 Among the nearly one-dozen claims raised by New Kids were 
unfair competition, commercial misappropriation, common-law misappro-
priation, and intentional interference with prospective economic ad-
vantage.337 
The Ninth Circuit in that case adopted nominative fair use to allow de-
fendants to use a protected trademark to refer to plaintiff’s goods or services. 
 330. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (“[U]se of the name, term, or device charged to be an in-
fringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark . . . of a term or device which is descriptive of and 
used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party . . . .”). 
 331. 543 U.S. 111 (2004). 
 332. 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 333. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 304. 
 334. Id. at 304. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. at 304–05. 
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“[N]ominative use of a mark—where the only word reasonably available to 
describe a particular thing is pressed into service—lies outside the strictures 
of trademark law,” the court held.338 The court adopted a three-part test to 
determine when nominative use is fair: (1) the product or service in question 
is not readily identifiable without use of the trademark, (2) only so much of 
the mark as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service is used, 
and (3) use of the mark does not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the 
trademark owner.339  
While the New Kids conceded the right of the newspapers and fans to 
discuss and refer to the band, they contested the newspapers’ right to profit 
from the band’s fame. The New Kids argued that “their fans, like everyone 
else, have limited resources . . . . [A] dollar spent calling the newspa-
pers[] . . . may well be a dollar not spent on New Kids products and services, 
including the New Kids’ own 900 numbers.”340 Thus, according to the New 
Kids, the nominative fair use defense was unavailable “where the use in ques-
tion competes directly with that of the trademark holder.”341 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument, and with it, the no-
tion that the New Kids could exercise hegemony over their fans’ money.342 
“Where, as here, the use does not imply sponsorship or endorsement, the 
fact that it is carried on for profit and in competition with the trademark 
holder’s business is beside the point.”343 The court concluded that “the 
trademark laws do not give the New Kids the right to channel their fans’ en-
thusiasm (and dollars) only into items licensed or authorized by them.”344 
In other trademark cases, many involving Barbie, the Ninth Circuit has 
recognized that the First Amendment is implicated when popular trade-
marks become iconic and indelible parts of the popular culture and lexicon. 
As the Ninth Circuit stated in a case involving a song parodying Barbie, 
when trademarks “transcend their identifying purpose” and “enter our pub-
lic discourse and become an integral part of our vocabulary,” they “assume[] 
 338. Id. at 308 (emphasis omitted) (“Because it does not implicate the source-
identification function that is the purpose of trademark, it does not constitute unfair competi-
tion; such use is fair because it does not imply sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark 
holder.”). 
 339. Id.; see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that Terri Welles, the Playboy Playmate of the Year in 1981, had a nominative fair use right to 
use Playboy trademarks, including “Playmate of the Year,” to describe herself on her website 
and the metatags to the site). 
 340. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 309. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. (“While the New Kids have a limited property right in their name, that right does 
not entitle them to control their fans’ use of their own money.”). 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id.  
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a role outside the bounds of trademark law.”345 In another Barbie parody 
case before the Ninth Circuit, Judge Harry Pregerson wrote, “[w]here a mark 
assumes such cultural significance, First Amendment protections come into 
play.”346 In these situations, “the trademark owner does not have the right to 
control public discourse whenever the public imbues his mark with a mean-
ing beyond its source-identifying function.”347 Trademark jurisprudence 
recognizes that intellectual property can have its own cultural life. The First 
Amendment is implicated in the ability of fans to immerse themselves in 
popular culture and imaginary worlds. 
There is a tension here with other areas of trademark law, such as the 
emergent law of initial interest confusion and sponsorship confusion, which 
seek to capture for trademark owners all the benefits conferred by the 
mark.348 Where there is no confusion as to sponsorship, however, trademark 
law itself does not confer an absolute right to the financial benefits of all 
pleasurable activity inspired by a popular culture work. Moreover, the im-
portance of competition calls into question the rebuttable presumption of 
sponsorship confusion upon evidence of copying, described earlier.349 To 
promote First Amendment interests in speech in trademarked works, courts 
ought to more liberally use the nominative use defense. Dewey’s conception 
of art as experience, Arrow’s learning by doing, and Polanyi’s tacit 
knowledge give further support to these First Amendment rights, as they 
highlight the critical interplay between cultural works, human discourse, and 
play. In the next Section, I turn to whether copyright law has, or ought to 
have, similar limits. 
B. Copyright Fair Use 
The fair use doctrine serves as an important and necessary limit on cop-
yright law’s seemingly boundless derivative work right. Today’s expansive 
derivative work right and fair use were codified together in the Copyright 
Act of 1976.350 Earlier, the 1870 Copyright Act had recognized authors’ de-
rivative work rights as extending only to the right to dramatize or translate 
their own works.351 The 1909 Copyright Act added the right to abridge.352 
The Copyright Act of 1976 radically expanded this right. The Act defined a 
derivative work as one “based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a 
 345. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding 
Danish pop band Aqua’s song, “Barbie Girl,” as a parody that constitutes protected “noncom-
mercial speech” under the Lanham Act). 
 346. Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 347. Id. (quoting MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 900). 
 348. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 349. See supra notes 109–117 and accompanying text. 
 350. Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. Copy-
right Soc’y U.S.A., 209, 214–15 (1983). 
 351. Id. at 214. 
 352. Id. 
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translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion 
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensa-
tion, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted.”353 The open-ended definition has allowed copyright owners in fan-
tasy worlds to extend their rights over the written word and film and musical 
adaptions to cover toys, amusement parks, and virtual worlds.354 Indeed, 
copyright owners of fantasy properties claim the right to control and benefit 
financially from any potential derivative market inspired by their copyright-
ed universe.355 Everything from fan fiction to a Pop-Up Bar to Quidditch 
leagues are tolerated at the copyright owner’s sufferance or ordered to cease 
and desist in the absence of a license.  
Star Wars would not be Star Wars without the Copyright Act of 1976, 
which expanded considerably from focusing on exact or substantially similar 
reproductions in the same medium to ownership of derivatives in a wide 
range of media, even those far flung from the original work.356 The derivative 
work right and Star Wars were born together. 
But there is another force in the legal galaxy intended to bring balance to 
the law. Fair use, codified for the first time in the 1976 Copyright Act, was 
intended to ensure that copyright law stay true to its purpose—incentivizing 
the creation of new works without impeding “the development of new ideas 
out of old.”357 As Judge Pierre Leval put it in a highly influential 1990 Har-
vard Law Review article, the fair use doctrine recognizes that 
“[n]otwithstanding the need for monopoly protection of intellectual creators 
to stimulate creativity and authorship, excessively broad protection would 
stifle, rather than advance, the objective.”358 Fair use, Judge Leval explained, 
“is a necessary part of the overall design” of copyright.359  
Fair use plays an express role in fostering copyright as a tool for the 
promotion of learning. Recognizing that “one must not put manacles upon 
science,”360 the statute’s preamble explains that “fair use may be made for 
generally educational or illuminating purposes ‘such as criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research.’ ”361  
 353. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added) (defining “derivative work”). 
 354. See Goldstein, supra note 350, at 209. 
 355. Id. at 227. 
 356. See id. at 214–15. 
 357. Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 
1109 (1990) (“Monopoly protection of intellectual property that impeded referential analysis 
and the development of new ideas out of old would strangle the creative process.”). 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. at 1110. 
 360. See Cary v. Kearsley (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (KB); 4 ESP. 168, 169 (quoting 
Lord Ellenborough). 
 361. Leval, supra note 357, at 1110 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982)).  
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More broadly speaking, fair use privileges transformative uses of an orig-
inal copyrighted work. Since Judge Leval argued that the transformative na-
ture of a secondary use should lie at the heart of the fair use inquiry,362 this 
question has become the driving question in fair use analyses.363 Judge Leval 
defined a transformative use as one where
[T]he secondary use adds value to the original—if the quoted matter is used 
as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aes-
thetics, new insights and understandings—this is the very type of activity 
that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.364
Leval continued: “The use must be productive and must employ the quoted 
matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original.”365
A use is not transformative if the secondary use “merely repackages or re-
publishes the original,”366 or would merely “supersede the objects” of the 
original.367 The Supreme Court has recognized that transformative works “lie 
at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the 
confines of copyright[,] and the more transformative the new work, the less 
will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh 
against a finding of fair use.”368
The derivative work right’s potential extension to all transformations of 
an original copyrighted work, and the fair use doctrine’s privileging of trans-
formative works, puts these two doctrines in direct tension.369 This Part 
elaborates how fair use law ought to apply to different kinds of fan activities. 
I posit three categories of transformative uses by fans: (a) works that promote 
learning by doing, (b) cases involving the creation of a new work, and (c) ex-
ploitation of derivative markets that plaintiff is unlikely to exploit. 
(a) Works that Promote Learning by Doing.
At the real world Camp Half-Blood kids embody characters from Rick 
Riordan’s books for a “whole learning approach” that seeks to help campers 
“make meaningful connections between history, mythology, literature, art, 
science, sports, current events, language and rampant creativity.”370 The im-
362. Id. at 1111 (“This question is vitally important to the fair use inquiry, and lies at the 
heart of the fair user’s case.”); id. at 1116 (“Factor One is the soul of fair use. A finding of justi-
fication under this factor seems indispensable to a fair use defense.”).
363. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Cariou v. Prince, 
714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
364. Leval, supra note 357, at 1111.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)).
368. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citation omitted).
369. Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgement in Law, 69 Ala. L. Rev. 381, 431–37 (2017) 
(demonstrating how all four prongs of the fair use test require aesthetic judgment).
370. E.g., Topher Bradfield, Dedicated to the Demigods: Our Lit Camps, L.A. Rev. Books:
Tumblr Edition (June 30, 2013), http://tumblr.lareviewofbooks.org/post/54268763139/
dedicated-to-the-demigods-our-lit-camps-by-topher [https://perma.cc/29F6-WCAT].
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mersive camp experience aids campers to “learn and utilize critical lateral 
problem solving skills and use creative play and teamwork to win the day.”371
Writing and performing an unofficial Harry Potter Musical at the University 
of Michigan helped college students like future Glee actor Darren Criss to 
hone their writing and performing skills. The craftsmen and women who 
create elaborate works of handmade art sold on Etsy use this platform to ex-
press themselves and to develop their artistic skill and reputation. 
The social benefits of learning by doing, including immersion and role-
playing, suggest these activities and experiences are highly transformative 
and are distinct from and not substitutes for the original works. Further-
more, as the Supreme Court stated, even commercial uses may be allowed, if 
the secondary use is highly transformative.372
Even for transformative works, however, the other factors must be con-
sidered. Particularly important is the second factor, the amount and substan-
tiality of the portion of the original work used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole. As Judge Leval recognized, “extensive takings may impinge 
on creative incentives.”373 A transformative work must take care not to copy 
too much of plaintiff’s original expression. A case involving an unauthorized 
Harry Potter reference book by a fan is instructive here. In Warner Bros. En-
tertainment v. RDR Books, the district court found that while reference books 
are transformative, in that case the defendant copied more of Rowling’s orig-
inal expressive language than was necessary.374 The court found that while 
copying names of characters, spells, and creatures from the Harry Potter
books was allowed in a reference book, defendant went too far by describing 
these items using J.K. Rowling’s exact expression, sometimes without 
quotes.375 Notably, the decision turned on substantial similarity, and not a 
claim that Rowling has the exclusive right to make Harry Potter derivative 
works, including reference books.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “the extent of permissible copy-
ing varies with the purpose and character of the use.”376 For example, copy-
ing some elements from the original is recognized as necessary in order for a 
work to be recognized as a parody.377 Fan activity, too, by its very nature 
must recall and reference “the canon.” Fidelity to the original in some re-
371. Telephone Interview with Topher Bradfield, supra note 76; Bradfield, supra note 
370.
372. Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (finding commercial nature of 2 Live Crew’s rap parody 
outweighed by the transformative nature of parody).
373. Leval, supra note 357, at 1112.
374. Id.
375. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
376. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–87.
377. Id. at 588 (“When parody takes aim at a particular original work, the parody must be 
able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit recog-
nizable.”).
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spects—for example, the use of protected characters and settings—is what 
makes the work recognizable as a fan work. Courts analyzing this factor in 
the context of fan activity must allow for copying of some characters and set-
tings as “raw materials” for new stories and experiences by fans, so long as 
the new work takes care not to copy the original author’s exact prose.
With respect to the third factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, this 
factor in contexts such as parody or fan activity is not “likely to help much in 
separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats . . . since parodies al-
most invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.”378 Fan activity by its 
very definition copies elements of highly expressive worlds. 
The fourth factor, the effect of defendant’s use on the potential market 
for plaintiff’s work “must take account not only of harm to the original but 
also of harm to the market for derivative works.”379 Notably, the Supreme 
Court rejected the presumption that any commercial use by defendant 
harms the market for the copyright owner.380 The Supreme Court required 
actual evidence of harm to plaintiff’s derivative market.381 The Court’s rea-
soning suggests that efforts by the copyright owner to merely reserve a right 
in a potential derivative market will not suffice to claim an exclusive right 
over a derivative market.382
The theories considered in Part III are instructive with respect to the fair
use factors. Aesthetic theory recognizes that claiming the exclusive right to 
control how and where a work is experienced interferes with the ability of 
individuals to freely engage works on their own terms, and to develop their 
own agency and understanding. Furthermore, Dewey’s work recognizing 
that aesthetic experience requires interaction with the cultural work around 
us elaborates why defendants need to copy some elements of plaintiff’s
work—e.g., characters and settings—to serve as the springboard for their 
own creative practices. The inevitable interplay between dominant cultural 
works and individuals and communities also explains why the third fair use 
factor is less relevant in the context of fan activity. Theories of learning by 
doing and tacit knowledge reveal knowledge disclosure and learning involves 
378. Id. at 586.
379. Id. at 590 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
568 (1985)).
380. Id. at 591 (“[W]hen, on the contrary, the second use is transformative, market sub-
stitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.”); id. (“No
‘presumption’ or inference of market harm . . . is applicable to a case involving something be-
yond mere duplication for commercial purposes.”).
381. Id. at 593 (“And while Acuff-Rose would have us find evidence of a rap market in 
the very facts that 2 Live Crew recorded a rap parody of ‘Oh, Pretty Woman’ and another rap 
group sought a license to record a rap derivative, there was no evidence that a potential rap 
market was harmed in any way by 2 Live Crew’s parody, rap version.”)
382. There is an important analogy in trademark law here. The 1988 Amendment to the 
federal Lanham Act eliminated the ability to reserve a trademark based on “token use.” See
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935; S. Rep. No. 100-515, 
at 5–6 (1988). This move curbed the anticompetitive practice of hording marks that are not 
actually being used in commerce.
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experience, activity, social elaboration, and indwelling. Finally, performance 
theory would distinguish between an individual’s unique performance in an 
unscripted summer camp, for example, where the individual makes unique 
choices and their own story, and the more straightforward reproduction the 
copyright law was meant to regulate.
Notably, some courts today reject application of fair use for fan fiction 
and fan activity off the bat under the presumption that fair use only protects 
parody, where there is market failure, and not fan activity, which pays hom-
age to the original work.383 But this approach is wrong for two reasons. First, 
this rigid bright-line-rule approach defies the requirement that fair use anal-
ysis take a case-by-case approach.384 Second, the parody analysis in Campbell
does not rest on a theory of market failure. In Campbell, the Court recog-
nized that “parody has an obvious claim to transformative value,” not be-
cause of the unavailability of a licensing market in such cases, but because of 
the “social benefit” of parody.385 Parody, the Court wrote, “[l]ike less ostensi-
bly humorous forms of criticism . . . [can] shed[] light on an earlier work, 
and, in the process, creat[e] a new one.”386 The Court held that “parody, like 
other comment or criticism, may claim fair use” under the statute.387 Notably, 
the Court does not separate parody from comment, but characterizes parody 
as a form of comment, which is expressly mentioned in the Preamble of 
§ 107.
The theories presented earlier provide a strong argument for preserving 
breathing space for comment, including but not limited to parody. Com-
ment is the very process by which individuals engage and understand cultur-
al knowledge. Comment under fair use is an important vehicle for engender-
383. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Axanar Prods., Inc., 121 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1699, 
1707 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (“[T]he Court has difficulty discerning from the Axanar Works any crit-
icism of the Star Trek Copyrighted Works. This is not surprising since Defendants set out to 
create films that stay faithful to the Star Trek canon and appeal to Star Trek fans.”).
384. The Supreme Court has pointed out that fair use shuns “bright-line rules, for the 
statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 
577; see also Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“The evaluation of these factors is ‘an open-ended and context-sensitive inquiry.’ ” (quoting 
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006)). Recently issued “guidelines” to Star Trek 
fans by Paramount Pictures and CBS are particularly problematic in this regard. Paramount 
and CBS state that in order to avoid being sued, “fan production must be less than 15 minutes 
for a self-contained story . . . not to exceed 30 minutes total with no additional seasons, epi-
sodes, parts, sequels or remakes.” See Blanche Johnson, CBS and Paramount Issue Guidelines to 
‘Star Trek’ Fans, Fox News Ent. (June 24, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/
2016/06/24/cbs-and-paramount-issue-guidelines-to-star-trek-fans.html (on file with the Mich-
igan Law Review). In addition, the guidelines forbid fans from using the name “Star Trek” in 
their titles, that the fan films only include amateur participants, and the works must be “non-
commercial, family friendly, and . . . display a disclaimer.” Id.
385. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
386. Id.
387. Id. (emphasis added).
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ing a broader view of the promotion of culture—focusing not narrowly on 
the production of more books, but considering equally the importance of 
book clubs and coffee houses in which to discuss and debate the cultural 
works of the day.388 Today, those fora include YouTube channels and Red-
dit.com.
(b) Cases Involving the Creation of a New Work.
The purpose of the copyright law is “[t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts.”389 Fair use, the Supreme Court declared, is “necessary 
to fulfill [this] very purpose.”390 The fair use doctrine “permits [and requires] 
courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, 
it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”391
Game of Thrones fan videos analyzing the popular TV show are another 
example of new works that are threatened with the copyright “notice and 
take down” regime under section 512 of the Copyright Act, which allows 
limited liability for internet intermediaries such as Google and YouTube so 
long as they provide for copyright owners to give notice of infringement.392
Algorithms intended to identify copyright infringement on the internet are 
inactivating video essays posted by Game of Thrones fans.393 These videos use 
short clips from the HBO TV series and quotations from George R.R. Mar-
tin’s books to create short essays that dive deeply into the moral and political 
dilemmas presented in the series.394 Most of these videos are highly trans-
formative comments on the originals, serving not just to entertain but to en-
gage fans in discussion and debate. Such videos easily qualify as the “creation 
of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.”395 As 
scholars have observed, however, the use of algorithms to determine copy-
right infringement poses particular problems for copyright fair use, which 
requires careful, case-sensitive adjudication.396
Injunctions are particularly troublesome in the context of the creation of 
a new work.397 The Supreme Court noted that while injunctive relief may be 
388. See Sunder, From Goods to a Good Life, supra note 48.
389. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
390. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575.
391. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research 
Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 70 (2d Cir. 1980)).
392. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
393. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 17.
394. See id.
395. Leval, supra note 357, at 1111.
396. Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3076139 [https://perma.cc/D4DC-KLQX]; see 
also Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2015) (requiring online service 
providers like YouTube to engage in good faith fair use analysis before taking down content).
397. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (“[T]he goals of 
the copyright law, ‘to stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter,’ are not always 
best served by automatically granting injunctive relief . . . .” (quoting Leval, supra note 357, at 
1134)).
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appropriate in straightforward cases of piracy, “such cases are ‘worlds apart 
from many of those raising reasonable contentions of fair use’ where ‘there 
may be a strong public interest in the publication of the secondary work 
[and] the copyright owner’s interest may be adequately protected by an 
award of damages for whatever infringement is found.’ ”398 The fair use doc-
trine “mediates between” “the property rights [copyright law] establishes in 
creative works, which must be protected up to a point, and the ability of au-
thors, artists, and the rest of us to express them—or ourselves by reference to 
the works of others, which must be protected up to a point.”399
(c) Exploitation of Derivative Markets that Plaintiff is Unlikely to Exploit.
Copyright owners act as though they have the right to exploit every po-
tential market inspired by their fantasy copyrighted works. But this expan-
sive claim has no basis in the law. In Campbell, the Supreme Court elaborat-
ed the fourth fair use factor’s reach, stating that the “market for potential 
derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in 
general develop or license others to develop.”400 There is a real question 
whether a temporary “pop-up bar” based on a copyrighted TV show, Quid-
ditch leagues, or even a real-life Batmobile are derivative markets that the 
copyright owner intends to exploit, let alone imagined. The Supreme Court’s
instruction that in determining the extent of the monopoly right in a deriva-
tive market, the parties ought to present evidence of actual harm to an exist-
ing market, is a good one, promoting innovation, competition, and speech. 
Plaintiffs should not have a right to horde all potential derivative uses and 
markets inspired by the original work. This rule promotes the utilitarian goal 
of more works, but also promotes freedom to imagine and experience a work 
free of the exclusive control of the intellectual property owner. Courts must 
expand their view of copyrighted works beyond the art object to the full hu-
man experience of art. This would privilege unlicensed enterprises that offer 
products, such as a mobile form of the Star Wars game Sabaac or brooms 
and uniforms for Quidditch leagues, allowing for follow-on creativity, deep 
play, and haptic engagement with the defining cultural works of our time. 
Fair use must recognize that the advance of culture requires not only the 
production of more works, but also participation in creative worlds that be-
come real artifacts of modern culture.
Conclusion
Intellectual property laws ought to promote the capacity of people to en-
joy, think about, play with, learn from, and critique the cultural works that 
dominate and shape ourselves and our societies. As Salman Rushdie cau-
tions, “[T]hose who do not have the power over the story that dominates 
398. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Leval, supra note 357, at 1132).
399. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2006).
400. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
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their lives, power to retell it, rethink it, deconstruct it, joke about it, and 
change it as times change, truly are powerless, because they cannot think 
new thoughts.”401
Intellectual property scholarship has paid scant attention to how fun-
damental experience and play are to our humanity. Again, I turn to Yale 
psychologist Paul Bloom, who observes that when life’s bare necessities of 
food, employ, and shelter are accounted for, “[w]hen we are free to do what-
ever we want, we retreat to the imagination—to worlds created by others, as 
with books, movies, video games, and television . . . or to worlds we our-
selves create, as when daydreaming and fantasizing.”402 Bloom argues that we 
enjoy imaginative experiences so much, not because they are an escape from 
reality, but because we do not distinguish them from reality. “We enjoy imag-
inative experiences,” he says, “because at some level we don’t distinguish 
them from real ones.”403
Cultural merchandise is often dismissed as crass commercialism. But 
cultural play has salutary benefits. Experiencing and doing with others mat-
ters. Our cultural worlds touch us. Fictional worlds become real in the sense 
that they become artifacts to be referenced and actors that shape our culture 
and ourselves. We must preserve the capability to critically and creatively 
engage cultural works with all our senses.
401. Salman Rushdie, Excerpts from Rushdie’s Address: 1,000 Days ‘Trapped Inside a Met-
aphor,’ N.Y. Times (Dec. 12, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/books/99/04/18/specials/rushdie-
address.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
402. Bloom, supra note 2, at 155.
403. Id. at 156.
